I N V I S I B L E C O N T R A C T S

George Mercier

STATE CREATED JURISTIC BENEFITS

[Pages 482-531]

7. By experiencing state created juristic benefits (such as through the vehicle of corporations by being shareholders/directors/officers). In 1910, the Supreme Court ruled that if a Prince creates some type of a profit or gain situation in Commerce (and remember that King's Commerce is a closed private domain belonging to Government), then the King can participate in taxing that profit or gain that the Prince created. [636]

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This Principle was applied to an Income Tax collection setting in FLINT VS. STONE TRACY COMPANY, 220 U.S. 108 (1910).

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When state created benefits are accepted by you, then the Commercial enrichment you experience within that state franchise is very much within the taxing power of the United States Government; and that is correct Law. [637]

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"While the tax in this case, as we have construed the statute, is imposed upon the exercise of the privilege of doing business under a corporate capacity, as such business is done under authority of state franchises, it becomes necessary to consider in this connection the right of the Federal Government to tax the activities of private corporations which arise from the exercise of franchises granted by the state in creating and conferring powers upon such corporations. We think it is the result of the cases heretofore decided in this court, that such business activities, though exercised because of state created franchises, are not beyond the taxing power of the United States. Taxes upon rights exercised under grants of state franchise were sustained by this court in RAILROAD COMPANY VS. COLLECTOR, 100 U.S. 595 (1879); UNITED STATES VS. ERIE RAILROAD, 106 U.S. 327 (1882). [See also 106 U.S., page 703 for opinions by Justices Bradley and Harlan]; SPRECKLES SUGAR REFINING COMPANY VS. MCCLAIN, 192 U.S. 397 (1903)."

- FLINT VS. STONE TRACY COMPANY, 220 U.S. 108, at 155 (1910).

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Additionally, the King can tax other state created Commercial benefits that are experienced by others like attorneys and accountants who, as Special Interest Groups, use the police powers of the state for their own private enrichment, by setting up shared monopolies and then experiencing higher revenues than otherwise obtainable under a LAISSEZ-FAIRE free market entry without restrictions on new lower priced competitors entering into their trade. [638]

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The objective of monopolies is to make money, they are enrichment oriented legal devices benefiting their members; the story told by members of the monopoly, deflecting the existential reasoning off to the side with sweet sounding lies that portray their monopoly's bleeding heart objectives as merely being just pure concerns of public welfare and QUALITY, are fraudulent. For a protracted and thorough discussion on the negative quality side effects of professional trade licensing, on how they fail their stated purposes [meaning that their purposes were fraudulently stated at the time of monopoly creation] and are counter-productive in a wide-ranging array of areas, and for a history of licensing, see David B. Hogan in THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LICENSING: HISTORY, EVIDENCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 7 Law and Human Behavior 117 (1983). Numerous other articles in the September, 1983 issue of LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR explain why quality necessarily degenerates in that inherently uncompetitive atmosphere that characterizes shared monopolies. In the old English Case of DAVENPORT AND HURDIS [11 Coke 86], the court there refers to the increase in prices and deterioration in quality and commodities, which necessarily results from the granting monopolies [see THE SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES, 83 U.S. 36, at 103 (1872).]

"In practice, such [regulatory] restrictions frequently are designed to give some profession or occupation monopoly power. It is, for example, very difficult to argue that most professional licensure laws are primarily concerned with quality control [see Stigler in THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC REGULATION, 2 Bell Journal of Economic and Management Science 3, at 13 (1971)]. Simple restrictions on the number of market participants are also generally explicit grants of monopoly power to a limited group. While limits on the number of taxicabs in a city may reduce traffic congestion, they also benefit license holders [see Kitch in THE REGULATION OF TAXICABS IN CHICAGO, 14 Journal of Law and Economics 285 (1971)."

- Susan Ross Adams in INALIENABILITY AND THE THEORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS, 85 Columbia Law Review 931 (1985).

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This game of using penal statutes to create shared enrichment monopolies is quite old, and yet look around you today and see how many bleeding heart folks there are, who really want to believe that line that Government is their friend, just somehow; and also fall for the fraudulent line that such a monopoly is for their own protective good -- by keeping all those evil quacks, vile frauds, and assorted degenerate incompetents out of the legal and medical professions. [639]

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Never mind the fact that before the Professions were monopolized, folks had to check references and exercise business judgment, as in any other business arrangement where you are dealing with unacquainted people. Today, the mere fact that licenses are in force automatically precludes much inquisitive background questioning that should still be asked -- Government has assumed the role of qualifier for you; and many persons holding licenses, when asked of their qualifications, refuse to give references and merely point attention over to that license -- dealing with such a person, shrouding his business background behind a veil of secrecy, is improvident. A prime example lies in the regulatory jurisdiction asserted over securities and related Commercial investment instruments -- the mere fact that Government has conducted a searching probe called FULL DISCLOSURE (a fraudulent characterization since much material is forbidden to be included in a PROSPECTUS), automatically reduces normal intensity questioning by prospective investors; and so as a result, investors are pre-emptively deprived of the ability to collect facts, exercise a risk/yield assessment judgment, and then make a risk investment -- Government is really your friend when stripping you of the important learning ability to acquire judgment experientially [try to ask a corporate officer for additional information not contained in that PROSPECTUS their lawyers wrote -- he won't give you any, since it is illegal; some big friend Government is]. Persons placing overriding priority on the perceived important function of protecting the public financially from investment con artists or investments without merit, to justify depriving other people of the exercise of their own comparative investiture placement judgment and the benefit of acquiring real intrinsic knowledge experientially, are manufacturing unnecessary Torts they will later regret, as the purpose of this Second Estate is exclusively intellectual. And any operation of Government which impairs or attempts to impede the acquisition of factual knowledge or the unrestricted flow of information between Individuals, is literally a Doctrine of Devils. And as for MD's, if licensed medical doctors know what they are doing as well, then why is it that whenever they go on strike, the death rate drops? [I am reminded of the circumstances that King Louis the 15th went through, when he was a small infant. He had contracted chicken pox, and an attending nurse hid him from the French medical profession to spare his life; doctors had previously killed Louis's brother and father during treatment].

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Although we might not be too philosophically sympathetic with the manipulative use of Legislatures to create monopolies and the Tortfeasance that is thrown at us in the adverse secondary circumstances flowing from their operations, as a matter of law, creating game rules for voluntary players in King's Commerce is largely immune from Constitutional restrainments. [640]

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"... and although we have no direct constitutional provision against a monopoly, yet the whole theory of a free Government is opposed to such grants, and it does not require even the aid which may be derived from the Bill of Rights [of Connecticut], the first section of which declares that 'no man or set of men, are entitled to exclusive public emoluments, or privileges from the community' to render them void. The statute of 21 James I., C. 3, which declares such monopolies to be contrary to law and void, except as to patents for a limited time, and printing, the regulation of which was at that time considered as belonging to the king's prerogative, and except also, certain warlike materials and manufactures, the regulation of which for obvious reasons may fairly be said to belong to the king, has always been considered as merely declaratory of the common law."

- NORWICH GAS VS. NORWICH CITY GAS, 25 Connecticut Reporter 19, at 38 (1856) [CONNECTICUT REPORT carries the Cases from the Connecticut Supreme Court.]

See also the briefs for Counsel in THE SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES [83 U.S. 36 (1872)] as they contain a great deal of legal material in opposition to monopolies [6 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at 475, by Kurland and Casper [University Publications, Arlington, Virginia (1975)]. The Supreme Court in THE SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES discusses the great CASE OF MONOPOLIES, decided during the reign of Queen Elizabeth which held that all monopolies, in any known trade or manufacture, are an invasion of the liberty of the Citizens to acquire property, and pursue happiness, and were declared void at Common Law, which is correct reasoning when applied to appropriate Tort Law factual settings lying outside of any participation in that closed private domain of King's Commerce. [THE SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES addressed the question as to whether or not monopolies were forbidden by the 13th Amendment and several clauses in the 14th Amendment, by reason of the damages they create on Citizens].

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In France in the 1600s, Finance Minister Jean Colbert once wrote a CODE OF COMMERCE [sometimes called the CODE SAVARY (1673)]. The Code created controlled entrance guilds, and laid down rules for apprenticeship and admissions of masters. An extensive number of trades were so regulated by the Code, and once entrance into those guilds was restricted [i.e., the number of possible competitors was restricted], then the demand for taxes immediately appeared:

"Each new guild was to pay certain sums for the granting to it of statutes and regulations..."

"Colbert raised money from the organization and reorganization of the guilds... and made of them before the century was out congealing monopolies which the state [wanted], because revenue could be raised from them." [641]

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COLBERT'S LIFE AND THEORIES, Volume I, page 309 and Volume II, page 457 [Columbia University Press (1939)].

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As a general rule, money raising statutes that generate enrichment for the Crown never die; and down to the present day, a portion of the Commercial law of France remains based on the 122 Articles of Colbert's CODE OF COMMERCE. [642]

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Levasseur, HISTORIE DE COMMERCE, I, 299-300.

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But here in the contemporary United States, once a state has got you tied into a licensing program of some type, then and there you are experiencing some type of state created juristic benefit, and as such, you then become a federal taxable object for this benefit accepting reason alone. When presented with such a state license, no other questions about the existence of the National Citizenship Contract, or any other juristic contract, ever need be asked by those termites in the IRS searching the Countryside for some meat to lay into. [643]

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Here in New York State, for example, Section 441(1)(d) of the Real Property Law defines individuals who are eligible to apply for, and receive, state licenses for the sale and brokerage of real estate. Licenses are granted freely to either Citizens of the United States, or to aliens; once a license to experience financial enrichment in a shared business monopoly has been issued, the state does not care about your political relational status to the King, or any associated benefits accepted thereby. With such a license in effect, for taxing purposes, your Prince has you tied down but good and tight.

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Other state monopolies like Driver's Licenses and motor vehicle registrations are very much used by the IRS in many ways to assist them in tax collections; and state tax collectors also use these records for their own statute enforcement and state treasury enrichment conquests as well. When those Driver's License records are collected by the state, they are also forwarded to Washington, and then redistributed to foreign persons and foreign political jurisdictions under numerous executive agreements, diplomatic and military treaties, and bureaucratic cordialities.

Yet, even though you entered into those state licenses merely to avoid your incarceration as an unlicensed driver, the uncontested preparation of a state created juristic personality, such through a Driver's License, to the Supreme Court would be prospectively sufficient for that Court to attach IN PERSONAM liability to Title 26 as a Person accepting special state created benefits. [644]

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"Whatever a state may forbid or regulate it may permit upon condition that a fee be paid in return for the privilege. And such a fee may be exacted to discourage the prosecution of a business or to adjust competitive or economic inequalities. Taxation may be made the implement of the exercise of the state's police powers."

- ATLANTIC & PACIFIC TEA COMPANY VS. GROSJEAN, 301 U.S. 412, at 426 (1936).

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It is also reasonable to infer that a Driver's License is evidence of Residency, and of the acceptance of a wide-ranging array of state benefits tailored to Residents. Remember that your use of those highways is your acceptance of a benefit that Government created, and since reciprocity is expected back in return, contracts are in effect: Invisible and automatic. [645]

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And the pronouncements of Highway Contract Protesters, arguing that Highway Contracts do not exist until the Driver's License application itself has been signed, is defective reasoning, as I will explain later.

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If you do so file objections to the assertion of a Beneficent Taxable Juristic Commercial Status over you by way of a Driver's License, you will need to again prove your present STATE OF MIND; and the exact state code criminalizing such innocuous behavior has to be quoted within the body of your Objection. Some folks prefer to play it safe and avoid the Driver's License altogether; while others selectively use deception in assuming a NOM DE PLUME for purposes of deflecting recourse identification. [646]

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Judges often have a difficult time ruling on the question as to whether or not an assumed name was fraudulently used to deceive other people. The reason why this difficulty is inherent with assumed names is due to the Common Law right of anyone to assume any name they feel like, how and when they feel like it, and without any petition to Government for such an assumption of a NOM DE PLUME. See UNITED STATES VS. COX, 593 F.2nd 46 (1979), and UNITED STATES VS. WASMAN, 484 F.Supp. 54 (1979), for Cases where Federal Judges wrestled quite a bit with this question.

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However, other folks are not able to so quickly terminate the Driver's License due to the fundamental importance of the thing and either their present inability to successfully handle a criminal prosecution or their reluctance to assign something deleterious to it; and so at a minimum, an Objection and a DECLARATORY JUDGMENT TO QUIET STATUS originated in Federal District Court is in order. The Declaratory Judgment, ruling that the Driver's License was a COMPELLED LICENSE, existing as a coerced instrument signed by you to avoid incarceration as an unlicensed driver, and is not to be used by the IRS or anyone else for the expansive purposes of evidence of either Residency or of Domiciliary, nor as evidence of entrance into Commerce, or of the taxable acceptance of federal or state created benefits, or of consent to be bound by any statute, other than those state motor vehicle statutes. The objective of our pursuit of a Declaratory Judgment is: That since the license was compelled out of us when some DE MINIMIS tension is in effect with a Substantive Right (the RIGHT TO TRAVEL), and since the avowed purpose of the license itself is to adduce EVIDENCE OF COMPETENCY, then the extraneous collateral expectations of reciprocity in any area outside of those Motor Vehicle Statutes it would otherwise create when left unchallenged, is now terminated. [647]

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The DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL is slightly different from COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL in that EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL precludes a litigant who wrongfully induced another to adversely change his position from asserting a right or defense, which is what happens when IRS termites start chopping away at the off-point benefits derived from a State License acquired solely to avoid penal consequences, under tension with a Substantive Right:

"... the effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is absolutely precluded, both at law and in equity, from asserting rights which might perhaps have otherwise existed, either of property, of contract, or of remedy, as against another person, who has in good faith relied upon such conduct, and has been led thereby to change his position for the worse, and who on his part acquires some corresponding right, either of property, of contract, or of remedy."

- J. Pomeroy in 3 EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, Section 804 95th Edition (1941)].

Traditionally, Courts have been reluctant to hold the operation of this Doctrine against the Government. [See generally ESTOPPEL AGAINST STATE, COUNTY, AND CITY in 23 Washington Law Review 51 (1948)]. Consequently, since Government is let off the responsibility hook, people with claims against the Government have often suffered wrongs unnecessarily that Courts would not have tolerated had both litigants been non-juristic parties; yet things have been loosening up a bit since the OIL SHALE CASES [see EMERGENCE OF AN EQUITABLE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT -- THE OIL SHALE CASES in 46 University of Colorado Law Review 433 (1975)]. In 1981, the Supreme Court seemed willing to entertain the use of this EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE against the Government in SCHWEIKER VS. HANSEN [see EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT by Deborah Eisen, in 67 Cornell Law Review 609 (1982)].

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If you are going to Object to, and have new narrow contours now defined on your Driver's License in order to restrain its use by other Government agencies as the high-powered King's Equity attachment instrument that it is, then the Objection should generally follow the model pattern set forth above in the discussion of Federal Reserve Notes. This Objection should refer to the exact state penal statute that you are applying for the license under Objection and protest, merely to avoid incarceration as an unlicensed driver. [648]

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Contracts entered into where arrest was threatened are coercive, and are wide open to attack. Read the story of the finding of the sunken lost Spanish Galleon ship, the ATOCHA, and the subsequent muscle threats by the State of Florida to arrest the underwater treasure hunters if they didn't agree to turn over a percentage of their treasure finds to the Florida Prince, in the STATE OF FLORIDA VS. TREASURE SALVORS, INC. [458 U.S. 670 (1980)]. Footnote number 4 refers to the Federal District Court in Florida that ruled that those contracts so signed were coercive. [If the treasure hunters were smart, they would have filed a REJECTION OF POLICE POWER BENEFITS with the State of Florida, and then present the Judiciary with an entirely different factual setting to rule on. Maybe the Treasure Hunters wanted the protectorate benefits of the guns and cages offered by the State; if so, then they should have tendered the reciprocity so expected.]

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Remember that the Supreme Court is in Washington, and you are out in California, Florida, or Texas, and it is unreasonable for you to assume that the Supreme Court knows the state statute that you are Objecting to, so quote it for them verbatim. How can you engage in involuntary behavior based on threats contained in a state statute, if you don't even know what the statute says? [649]

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When addressing an evidentiary question -- such as the appropriateness of assigning BURDENS OF PROOF to either Government or the Individual, under circumstances where the Individual does not want to do something but penal statutes intervene to change his reluctance -- Justice Frankfurter once said that:

"Where an individual engages in conduct by command of a penal statute... to whose laws he is subject, the gravest doubt is case on the applicability of the normal assumption -- even in a prosecution for murder (see LELAND VS. OREGON, 343 U.S. 790) -- that what a person does, he does of his own free will. When a consequence as drastic as [enfranchisement] may be the effect of such conduct, it is not inappropriate that the Government should be charged with proving that the Citizen's conduct was a response, not to the command of the statute, but to his own direction. The ready provability of the critical fact -- existence of an applicable [penal] law, particularly a criminal law, commanding the act in question -- provides protection against shifting the burden to the Government on the basis of a frivolous assertion of the defense of duress. Accordingly, the Government should, under the circumstances of this case, have the burden of proving by clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence that the Citizen voluntarily performed an act causing [enfranchisement]."

- Justice Frankfurter in NISHIKAWA VS. DULLES, 356 U.S. 129, at 141 (1957).

The actual factual circumstances in NISHIKAWA involved similar Tort questions of the unfairness of involuntary expatriation when a Citizenship Contract is hanging in the background.

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If you are just too busy to go down to the law library and find out the exact wording of that penal statute, I have no sympathy for any rebuffment that you will experience later on as some appellate forum rules adversely against you, on the grounds that your STATE OF MIND was not clarified substantively or timely. Also included should be a brief recap of the RIGHT TO TRAVEL Cases in the United States Supreme Court. [650]

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Such as:

- EDWARDS VS. CALIFORNIA, 314 U.S. 160

- TWINING VS NEW JERSEY, 211 U.S. 78

- WILLIAMS VS. FEARS, 179 U.S. 270, AT 274

- CRANDALL VS. NEVADA, 6 WALL. 35, AT 43-44

- THE PASSENGER CASES, 7 HOWARD 287, AT 492

- U.S. VS. GUEST, 383 U.S. 745, AT 757-758 (1966)

- GRIFFIN VS. BRECKENRIDGE, 403 U.S. 88, AT 105-106 (1971)

- CALIFANO VS. TORRES, 435 U.S. 1, AT 4, note 6

- SHAPIRO VS. THOMPSON, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)

- CALIFANO VS. AZNAVORIAN, 439 U.S. 170, AT 176 (1978)

All of which were cited in ALEXANDER HAIG VS. CIA AGENT PHILIP AGEE, 435 U.S. 280, at 306 (1980), which reaffirmed the RIGHT TO TRAVEL within the United States, and then distinguished that Right from the lessor administrative "freedom" to travel outside the TERRA FIRMA of the United States as being discretionary, within reasonable limits, by the King over his Subjects, as all "Citizens" are operating under the administrative jurisdiction of contractual King's Equity. See also a separate but parallel FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT DOCTRINE; and UNITED STATES VS. LAUB, 385 U.S. 475 (1966); and THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL: THE PASSPORT PROBLEM by Louis Jaffee in 35 Foreign Affairs, at 17 (October, 1956) which discusses, at a light level, the national interest implications involved when the RIGHT TO TRAVEL is under tension with statutes.

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Patriots and Highway Protesters are reaching incorrect conclusions when they cite the RIGHT TO TRAVEL Cases as being sufficiently substantive to annul state statutes requiring highway operator's licenses. Those RIGHT TO TRAVEL Cases only offer a line of reasoning parallel with your objectives. Only in loose DICTA does the reasoning found in the RIGHT TO TRAVEL Cases support your position; so they offer a mitigating source of relief against state statutes, but not a necessarily vitiating source of relief. Nowhere did our Founding Fathers restrain the states from requiring licenses to operate motor vehicles or anything else on public highways, and the words RIGHT TO TRAVEL do not even appear anywhere in the Constitution. [651]

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Remember the word PUBLIC, as used by Judges, generally means GOVERNMENT. When appellate judges use the words AFFECTS A PUBLIC INTEREST to justify some further state intervention somewhere, what they mean is that a Government interest is affected. As applied to Highway law, partial justification for the state judicial affirmance of the requirement to hold an operator's license is the fact that the regulatory jurisdiction the State Legislature is asserting over those highways does, in fact, "affect a Governmental interest," as it is the state that spends the money to acquire the land, build the highway, and then spends incredible amounts of more money, year in and year out without any let up, to maintain those roads. If that does not affect a Governmental interest, then would someone explain just what would?

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And although the words RIGHT TO TRAVEL do not appear anywhere in the Constitution, the Supreme Court has, through their Opinions, given that right Constitutional status cognizance. [652]

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"...[The] right finds no explicit mention in the Constitution. The reason, it has been suggested, is that a right so elementary was conceived from the beginning to be a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created. In any even, freedom to travel throughout the United States has long been recognized as a basic right under the Constitution. ... The constitutional right to travel from one State to another... occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right that has been firmly established and repeatedly recognized."

- UNITED STATES VS. GUEST, 383 U.S. 745, at 757 et seq. (1966) [Sentences were quoted out of order].

Although that statement is correct, it only applies to INTERSTATE travelling. Protesting Patriots suggesting that fraudulent factual averments of INTERSTATE travelling be adduced as defensive instruments in local traffic prosecution arguments, as I have heard, are improvident -- the selective incorporation of deception into your MODUS OPERANDI will only postpone the day of arrival for that SILVER BULLET which Highway Contract Protesters are searching for, a bullet which lies within yourselves.

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But whatever DE MINIMIS protective penumbra the RIGHT TO TRAVEL Cases offers, you are now invoking to abate both your regional Prince and the King's Tax Collectors who use Department of Motor Vehicle information and legal assumptions that information infers for their own enrichment purposes. In this circumstantial context of submitting a carefully pre-planned and prepared written Objection, where time is not of the essence, failure to cite your authorities (failure to explain your justifications) timely could be fatal. You are up against high-powered adversaries, and lightly drafting papers, as if you were on a picnic, is fatal. Judges do not owe you Justice aligned with your philosophy; those are adversary court proceedings you are in, where mere preponderance wins, and an insubstantive Objection is open to attack. (And remember that a RIGHT TO TRAVEL also lies outside of, and beyond the reach of, the King's Charter (the Constitution). [653]

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Does the following restrainment on Government appear any place in the Constitution?...

"The streets belong to the public in the ordinary way. Their use for purposes of gain is special and extraordinary, and generally at least, may be prohibited or conditioned as the legislature deems proper."

- PACKARD VS. BARTON, 264 U.S. 140, at 144 (1923).

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Some judicial forms from another era have applied the LIBERTY CLAUSE in the Fifth Amendment to restrain the interference by the FEDERAL GOVERNMENT in the RIGHT TO TRAVEL area (but keep in mind that those Cases were ruled upon in an era when automobiles and other high-powered technology did not exist in the United States, and highway contracts WITH STATES did not exist then, as well). [654]

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"The right to travel is part of the "liberty" of which the Citizen cannot be deprived of, without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment... Freedom of movement across frontiers... and inside frontiers as well, was part of our heritage..."

- KENT VS. DULLES, 357 U.S. 116, at 125 (1958).

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So your objective in having the contours of the Driver's License restrained to now apply only to Highway Contract grievances, the RIGHT TO TRAVEL being claimed is both of a Constitutional origin, as well as of a Natural origin, ex-Constitutional. [655]

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The Supreme Court once ruled that the RIGHT TO TRAVEL interstate overruled State arguments of social or economic consequences:

"The right to interstate travel had long been recognized as a right of constitutional significance, and the Court's decision, therefore, did not require an AD HOC determination as to the social or economic importance of that right."

- SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT VS. RODRIGUEZ, 411 U.S. 1, at 32 (1973).

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But important for the moment is the Objection itself, and your Declaration therein that you are not a Resident or a Citizen of that State together with correlative supporting averments of Benefit Rejections, [656]

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Remember that Residency contracts are presumed to be in effect, and contracts have to be attacked for substantive reasons, such as FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION, and do not roll over and die by your mere unilateral declarations of their nonexistence.

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regardless of any statute that facially appears to force Residency Status on persons physically inhabited in that state for an extended period of time. [657]

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In certain pleading contexts, there is not a lot of legal difference between a DOMICILIARY and a RESIDENT. In HAMMERSTEIN VS. LYNEE [200 Federal 165 (1912)], a Federal District Court ruled that the word RESIDE in the 14th Amendment's State Citizenship Clause also meant DOMICILIARY. One of the characteristics of the English Language is the lack of identity of some of the words that comprise its structure; many words have found multiple homes in different locations, and therefore meanings must be abated pending consideration of an enlarged context of the surrounding words. RESIDENCE and DOMICILE are two such words in Law that, on some occasions, are interchangeable, and on other occasions, are not interchangeable. The recurring semantic nature of some words [that Judges are partly responsible for since they continuously refuse to define explicit meanings] to be inherently difficult broncos to tie down, was noted once by a Federal Court, when dealing with a DOMICILIARY question:

"The theoretical domicile which is equivalent to State Citizenship is always one which exists ANIMO REVERTENDI [meaning WITH INTENTION TO REVERT BACK]. The theoretical domicile which clings to a homeless wanderer, who never intends to return, has its uses in deciding rights of succession to property, in respect to taxation and to the administration of pauper laws, but is not, I think, equivalent to Citizenship in the sense in which the word "citizen" is used in the Judiciary Act. While domicile, in some sense, may not be lost by mere departure with intent not to return, State Citizenship is thus lost. In other words, where the word "domicile" is used as meaning home, where absence from domicile is AMINO REVERTENDI, domicile may be equivalent to State Citizenship; but where domicile exists merely by legal fiction, and absence is accompanied by intent never to return to the state of domicile, the word is not synonymous with Citizenship."

- PANNIL VS. ROANOKE TIMES COMPANY, 252 Federal 910, at 915 (1918).

Therefore, correctly pleading Supreme Court rulings on the purely voluntary nature of Citizenship is suggested, and that you are an Inhabitant of that State WITHOUT JURISTIC BENEFITS, and neither a Resident nor a Domiciliary BENEFIT ACCEPTANT; but your self-proclaimed status as an INHABITANT means nothing until you first reject all state constitutional benefits, and the benefits of Residency, and the police protectorate powers, in particular.

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But if your Objection does conform to this model, then a Judge generally will be reluctant to hold the spurious unrelated reciprocity terms of a Commercial contract (which Driver's Licenses can be applied to operate as a Commercial Enfranchisement Instrument under some limited circumstances) against a person, in a setting other than the originally specified terms, who has proved that they entered into that contract under compelled circumstances in order to avoid incarceration merely to enjoy a Substantive natural Right (the RIGHT TO TRAVEL), and without experiencing any Commercial benefit therefrom. [658]

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State Residency statutes were once overruled by the Supreme Court on grounds relating to RIGHT TO TRAVEL. In SHAPIRO VS. THOMPSON [394 U.S. 618 (1969)], the Supreme Court ruled that the INTERSTATE right to travel overruled and annulled state residency statutes [where welfare grants offered by States restricted to persons living in that kingdom for at least one year, where annulled. This is a unique case in the sense that its reasoning will never surface anywhere else, as the claimed "chilling effect" the state residency statutes generated on the Interstate Right to Travel represented one of philosophical justification. Substitute the same "chilling effect" RIGHT TO TRAVEL reasoning on any other Patriot state residency Protester case, and the Federal Judge will snort at you.

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That is the type of an Objection the Supreme Court wants to hear. The documentation and proof that the Supreme Court would want to see is a copy of the application for the Driver's License where it says you signed it under protest; proof of service of your Objection on state officials, the Objection itself, and a 30-day invitation to those state officials to let them cancel or rescind the Driver's License if the application of Commercial Status and/or Residency Status is deemed mandatory on all License holders (thus requiring those state officials to come out of the closet and expose some Status oriented law to you they might not want you to know). Under your DECLARATORY JUDGMENT, the Driver's License will be construed to act exclusively as EVIDENCE OF COMPETENCY under Motor Vehicle statutes only. [659]

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"Automobile licenses are issued periodically to evidence that the drivers holding them are sufficiently familiar with the rules of the road and are physically qualified to operate a motor vehicle."

- DELAWARE VS. PROUSE, 440 U.S. 648, at 658 (1978).

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If they do decide to rescind, this is a classic Case for Administrative Law intervention; and in either alternative administration disposition, you win. Here, our administrative grievance with the state concerns the disputed Commercial and Enfranchised Residency Citizenship Status that your Driver's License will otherwise be judicially construed to convey in the future. Uncontested Driver's Licenses can very much be used by state taxing commissions as evidence of Residency, and hence evidence of an IN PERSONAM attachment of liability for the expected reciprocal payment of benefits accepted on the state Income Tax, among many other juristic things. As viewed by sophisticated appellate judges, for state vehicle code enforcement purposes, Driver's Licenses are EVIDENCES OF AN OPERATOR'S COMPETENCY, and are not, in this context, the Evidences of Consent to be Regulated in Commerce that Highway Contract Protesters occasionally talk about. The state does not need any "Driver's License" from you, in order to force you into an administrative contract when you accept the benefits of driving a motor vehicle down a state highway. Patriots propagating the view that the mere existence and non-existence of a Driver's License attaches and detaches liability to those state highway regulatory statutes are misleading their followers: You don't need any written contract on someone in order to sue someone and bring him into a Court and perfect a judgment against the poor fellow -- but you do need to show the acceptance of benefits and of the expectation of reciprocity, which elements are very much present when a motor vehicle is operated on state provided highways, with "Public Notice" statutes creating the expectation of reciprocity.

Under this setting, it might be preferable to move directly for a Judicial Declaration of Status, rather than pursuing Administrative ESTOPPEL remedies. That DECLARATORY JUDGMENT is important protection material for you in other non-related areas of taxation, and you have a good chance of getting one issued out, and so submission of your Case to a sequence of state Administrative Law procedures, in hopes of using Collateral Estoppel abatement arguments later on, might be discouraged in this instance. Federal Judges will be reluctant to listen to California Motor Vehicles Department Administrative Law questions in an IRS Case of some type, even though the Judge knows very well that there is some peripheral merit to what you are saying. And so all factors considered, jumping to a DECLARATORY JUDGMENT becomes appropriate by necessity in this unusual factual setting of redefining the contours of an Adhesion Contract Driver's License to a limited and narrowed construction (meaning: Evidence of Highway Competency, only).

One of the evolving stages in the life of what are now contemporary penal Motor Vehicle Statutes had, as one of their previous stages, the purpose of assigning legal rights and liabilities to Motor Vehicle operators so that civil litigants can have fault and damages assessed against them in a courtroom.

For example, in Massachusetts, it originally was known as the TRESPASSER ON THE HIGHWAY DOCTRINE; [660]

[660]=============================================================

In 1692 the Colonial Legislature of Massachusetts enacted a little slice of LEX, called the LORD'S DAY ACT, that said:

"... no traveller... shall travel on that day..."

In 1876, a negligent Defendant successfully invoked this statute to bar the recovery by a Plaintiff who was injured while walking on a Sunday [SMITH VS. BOSTON AND MAINE R.R., 120 Mass. 490 (1876)]. To the Supreme Judicial Court, the Plaintiff was "... unlawfully traveling upon the highway" [id., at 492]. In 1877, the Massachusetts Legislature removed the civil liabilities that permeated the LORD'S DAY ACT.

=============================================================[660]

and later evolved into a regulatory jurisdiction when Massachusetts enacted a comprehensive Motor Vehicle Act after automobiles made their highway appearance. [661]

[661]=============================================================

"... all automobiles... shall be registered" and "... no automobile... shall be operated... unless registered."

- MASSACHUSETTS ACTS, c.473, Section I,3 (1903).

Six years later, in DUDLEY VS. NORTHHAMPTON STREET RAILWAY [202 Mass. 443 (1909)], the court denied an owner of an unregistered car recovery against a negligent Defendant on the ground that the former was a "trespasser on the highway." Although the Defendant pressed the analogy of the LORD'S DAY CASES, the court was able to find additional support for its ruling, by attributing to the statute a purpose of facilitating identification of motor travelers by requiring registration of vehicles. By also forbidding the operation an unregistered automobile, the court found it logical to charge the motor vehicle owner and operator of an unregistered motor vehicle with liability for damages caused to others, regardless of any mitigating negligence elements present in the factual setting. In FAIRBANKS VS. KEMP, 226 Mass. 75 (1917), the owner of an unregistered automobile, although exercising due care and caution, was held liable because of a statutory violation]. See, generally,

- Huddy in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW, Section 249 (1932); Fifth Edition;

- Editor's Note in TRESPASSER ON THE HIGHWAY DOCTRINE, 46 Harvard Law Review (1946).

=============================================================[661]

The talk from Patriots and Highway Contract Protesters that I hear constantly, about how the old Common Law says this and that about my rights to use Government Highways anyway that I feel like it, [662]

[662]=============================================================

"Highways are public roads, which every Citizen has a right to use."

- 3 Kent Commentaries 32.

See also; several English authorities:

- SUTCLIFFE VS. GREENWOOD, 8 Price 535;

- REX VS. CAMBERWORTH, 3 B. & Adol. 108.

And for other English commentators, see:

- SHELFORD ON HIGHWAYS;

- WOOLRYCH ON WAYS.

For American authorities, a point of beginning is:

- MAKEPEACE VS. WORTHEN, 1 N.H. 16;

- PECK VS. SMITH, 1 Connecticut 103;

- ROBINS VS. BORMAN, 1 Pick. 122;

- JACKSON VS. HATHAWAY, 15 Johns. 477;

- STACKPOLE VS. HEALY, 16 Massachusetts 33, and the many Case citations therein.

=============================================================[662]

is actually not relevant today in the United States. [663]

[663]=============================================================

For a detailed presentation of what our Father's simple Highway Common Law was like in that serene and tranquil era, before automotive technology contamination steamrolled our Common Law into the ground by way of an overriding contract, see: TREATISE ON THE LAW OF HIGHWAYS, by Joseph Angell [Little, Brown & Company (1868)], and its Second Edition, published in 1886; and LAW OF ROADS AND STREETS, by Byron Elliott [Brown Merrill & Company (1890)] and its Second Edition published in 1900. Both books have thousands and thousands of Case citations. The Fourth Edition has two volumes and was co-authored by Byron and William Elliott [Bobbs-Merrill Company, Indianapolis (1926)].

=============================================================[663]

Reasons: First, the factual setting that our Father's Common Law on free ingress and egress developed out on the King's Highways is not replicated today in the United States, since technology has changed the factual setting that our Father's Common Law used to operate on. [664]

[664]=============================================================

What technology has done to our Law on a factual setting of Government highways is the same that technology has done to the Law of Patent Property Rights:

"I have little doubt, in so far as I am entitled to express an opinion, that the vast transforming forces of technology have reduced obsolete much of our patent law."

- Felix Frankfurter in MARCONI WIRELESS VS. UNITED STATES, 320 U.S. 1, at 63 (1942).

And just as technology rolled up its sleeves and went to work to convert our once quiescent highways over into a setting of high-powered vehicles, so too has technology gone to work on running our Patent Law into the ground; and now also privacy itself has also fallen by the wayside, as technological innovations make their appearance on the scene:

"Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the next step which must be taken for the protections of the person, and for securing to the individual what Judge Cooley calls the right 'to be let alone.' Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprises have invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that 'what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the housetops [footnotes deleted]."

- Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY, 4 Harvard Law Review 193, at 195 (1890).

Constitutions can very much be written to organically self-enlarge with the passage of time to be made to apply to factual settings then unknown at the time that Constitution was being written; but our Founding Fathers in 1787 did not do that.

=============================================================[664]

Contemporary technology has very much changed the quiescent HORSE & BUGGY era and pedestrian highway factual setting our Father's Common Law grew up on. [665]

[665]=============================================================

For a recent presentation of what technology will do to trigger the appearance of Highway regulatory LEX where there had been none before, a view of PITCAIRN ISLAND in the South Pacific is revealing. Pitcairn Island is steeped in the allure of intrigue, as it was colonized by Fletcher Christian and his fellow mutineers from the HMS BOUNTY in 1790. It is a British Colony two square miles in area and is administered by an Island Council under the British High Commissioner Governor in New Zealand. For all of Pitcairn's history up until recent days, only pedestrians and wheelbarrows were even seen on its highways, but in 1965, things changed. A heavy Bristol crawler tractor made its appearance on the Island [see the PITCAIRN MISCELLANY (the Island newspaper) for January 31, 1965]; and soon that tractor was followed by a second tractor [id., August 31, 1965]. Within a few months after the first tractor had arrived, a large number of imported bicycles were making their appearances, and so now the appearance of some LEX was imminent for Pitcairn Island:

"With so many bikes here, traffic rules will be the next new thing to be introduced here."

- Editorial, PITCAIRN MISCELLANY, August 31, 1965.

Sure enough, the road LEX soon followed in November, 1965 [id., November 30, 1965] by vote of the Island Council.

=============================================================[665]

In the old HORSE AND BUGGY days of England, highways were largely dirt paths acquired from the easement forfeiture from adjoining landowners. Here in the United States up until the 1940s or so, there was an extensive network of privately owned toll roads -- Government was just not "into" highways that much. In old England, the King never spent any money on those dirt paths called highways, as there was nothing to maintain; so when foul weather, even adverse weather lasting across an entire season made its appearance, then the roads simply ground to a standstill, and noting moved. [666]

[666]=============================================================

Back in the old days, when highways became impassable, things drew to a standstill -- and society literally stopped and occasionally starved as well:

"Roads were so bad, and the chain of home trade so feeble, that there was often scarcity of grain in one part, and plenty in another part of the kingdom."

- ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA under "Corn Laws" [Cambridge, England (1910)] 11th Edition.

=============================================================[666]

But today, Government is spending incredible amounts of money, year in and year out, to build and maintain highways, so RIGHT TO TRAVEL argument parallels that folks draw that try to disable the contemporary ability of the King to even ask for reciprocity back in return for benefits offered are incorrect -- since in the old days, the King was not offering a special benefit to begin with (except in some London streets constructed with cobblestone), and so to say that the King was once disabled back then from asking for reciprocity when the King never initially provided any benefits, is an incorrect parallel built upon disparate factual settings.

And today, high-powered technology routinely causes wholesale death and destruction when an operator does no more than momentarily lose absolute mental concentration on driving -- and in such a factual setting, an honest assessment by Highway Contract Protesters of the underlying legitimacy of the requirement that there be EVIDENCE OF COMPETENCY, would necessarily result in the conclusion that a Driver's License, so called, really isn't all that unreasonable, and is in fact, very reasonable. [667]

[667]=============================================================

"We agree that the States have a vital interest in ensuring that only those qualified to do so are permitted to operate motor vehicles, that these vehicles are fit for safe operation, and hence that licensing, registration, and vehicle inspection requirements are being observed."

- DELAWARE VS. PROUSE, 440 U.S. 648, at 658 (1978).

=============================================================[667]

So it is technology that is responsible for the Prince's Highway LEX, and not the traffic density congestion that is created from the mere existence of other people in Society. [668]

[668]=============================================================

In ancient times, metropolitan cities were frequently heavily congested with traffic. Long before the City of Paris leveled entire neighborhoods to widen some streets in the 1700s, in the First Century B.C., Julius Caesar banned wheeled traffic (not pedestrians) from the streets of Rome during peak daylight hours. The result was that to some extent the wheeled traffic waited until dusk to use the streets; pedestrians were free to use the streets during the daylight hours, causing wheeled vehicles to shift their street congestion into late night hours [see C.A.J. Skeel in TRAVEL IN THE FIRST CENTURY AFTER CHRIST, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ASIA MINOR, at 65; Cambridge University Press (1901)].

=============================================================[668]

An interesting and very strong argument can be made by your adversaries, arguing that it would be the failure of the states to preemptively regulate the highways by licensing that interferes with your RIGHT TO TRAVEL, since having physiologically incompetent drivers out on the highways obstructs and interferes with the RIGHT TO TRAVEL of those other drivers who are competent. [669]

[669]=============================================================

"... it has always been recognized as one of the powers and duties of a Government to remove obstructions from the highways under its control."

- IN RE DEBS, 158 U.S. 573, at 586 (1894).

=============================================================[669]

And your adversaries have a truckload full of statistics to support their line of reasoning. [670]

[670]=============================================================

"Laws requiring that drivers be licensed and that applicants be subjected to thorough examination apparently are a more effective means of reducing accidents."

- Note, DEVELOPMENT OF STANDARDS IN SPEED LEGISLATION, 46 Harvard Law Review 838, at 842 (1942).

In footnotes 31, 32 and 33, the TRAVELLER'S INSURANCE COMPANY is found disseminating information on highway traffic accidents back in the 1920s and 1930s; having achieved their important objectives of filling the Motor Vehicle Statute books full of penal codes, the insurance companies largely faded away from the scene.

=============================================================[670]

Do you see what a difficult corner clever insurance companies have worked judges into? Their arguments are logical, and coming up from a factual setting steeped in the presence of juristic contracts, great weight will be given to their arguments, no matter how self-serving, twisted, or vicious they may be. [671]

[671]=============================================================

Special Interest looters, Tory Aristocrats, and Gremlins, reigning supreme up and down the corridors of American legislatures, have been going to work on the meat there since the founding of the Republic:

"That corruption should find its way into the Governments of our infant republic, and contaminate the very source of legislation, or that impure motives should contribute to the passage of a law, or the formation of a legislative contract, are circumstances most deeply to be deplored."

- FLETCHER VS. PECK, 10 U.S. 87, at 130 (1810).

Here in 1985, the only persons who would actually try and dispute the presence of looters in American legislatures are those folks who live most distant from reality, of which there are quite a few, and collectively they write many books which in turn propagates their error, which is sometimes intentional.

=============================================================[671]

Whenever anyone, regardless of your relational Status off the highways, uses those Government highways, an invisible contract is in effect right then and there; it is not necessary for your regional Prince, the State, to adduce written evidence of your consent -- just like it is not necessary to get a contract in writing to get the contract enforced judicially. [672]

[672]=============================================================

If I am a roofing contractor, and we agree to have me repair your roof, I don't need any written contract on you at all to throw MECHANIC'S LIENS on your property, perfect an IN REM Judgment against your house, and then sell at Foreclosure your own house right out from underneath you -- without anything having been placed "in writing;" I do not need your "consent" to get my money out of your house, if you default on the contract. A Highway Contract Protester would argue that since nothing was signed, the contract does not exist; but your arguments are defective, and you Protesters don't know what you are talking about.

=============================================================[672]

When Protesters get up in the morning, get out the old car, and drive into the street, they are literally driving themselves into a contract -- as the Protester then and there accepted benefits conditionally offered by the State -- no where in your State Constitution does it require the Prince to build and maintain those Highways of his, so his building and offering those Highways for your consideration and possible use is purely discretionary on his part; nor is your Prince restrained from possessing any expectation of reciprocity from PERSONS accepting the benefits derived from the use of those Government Highways. [673]

[673]=============================================================

Today, regional Princes are calling the shots on Highway regulatory matters -- tomorrow, the King intends to grab for himself those Highways. EXECUTIVE ORDER 11921 ["Adjusting Emergency Preparedness Assignments..."], largely for use in a POST-WAR scenario, claims jurisdiction to recover from National Emergencies [See 41 FEDERAL REGISTER 24293 for June 15th, 1976]. Sections 804(4)(b) ["Construction, use and management of highways, streets, and appurtenant structures..."] to justify this impending Federal grab, as soon as some emergency can be manufactured. This EXECUTIVE ORDER 11921 superseded in art, and complemented in part, an earlier EXECUTIVE ORDER 11940 from the Nixon era [October 28, 1969], that was designed to justify Federal PRE-WAR seizure of everything.

=============================================================[673]

So our Father's old Common Law isn't being contaminated at all by Star Chamber Traffic Court judges ignoring the fact that no Tort damages were caused by the criminal defendant, as they go about their work prosecuting technical infractions to Highway Contracts: Because neither of the twin Tort indicia of either MENS REA or CORPUS DELECTI deficiency arguments sounding in the sugar sweet liability vitiating music of Tort Law that Highway Contract Protesters love to throw at Traffic Court judges, are not even relevant whenever contracts are up for review and enforcement -- they never have been, and they never will be, and the Last Day before Father will not be any exception. [674]

[674]=============================================================

In some States, criminal procedure statutes were written in such a way that CRIMINAL INTENT was required to be adduced by prosecuting attorneys under circumstances where contracts are actually in effect. Patriots who know how to weasel out of traffic prosecutions in those few States where this legislative rule is in effect, by citing those CRIMINAL INTENT requirement statutes on NO DRIVER'S LICENSE PROSECUTIONS, are not correct in associating any prevailing significance to the existence of those statutes, other than the fact that, yes, some clown in their legislature once messed up -- just like legislatures have messed up elsewhere in criminal procedure statutes in other states. Those State statutes were written by INTELLIGENTSIA lawyers -- and so now the degenerate commingling of Tort indicia into contract infractions by a few states, together with the willful withholding of the identification of the creation of invisible contracts when special juristic benefits were quietly accepted out in the practical setting (benefits carrying regulatory hooks of lingering reciprocity expectations along with them) by many other States, is not to be construed as overruling the authenticity of the information presented herein. Errors and other enactments representative of improvident reasoning by legislatures are actually quite frequent in American legal history; and always remember that legislatures do not create NATURE -- they never have and they never will.

=============================================================[674]

Many folks out there are searching for a SILVER BULLET; I hear references to that perennial search constantly. They are searching for some legal procedure, some great air-tight line of reasoning, some great legal brief that just ties it all together, to throw at the IRS and Traffic Court judges. These folks are missing the boat, so to speak, all together: Because the origin to their frustration lies in invisible contracts, and you become a party to those invisible contracts because you accepted some benefit someone else was conditionally offering. [675]

[675]=============================================================

"Men fight and lose the battle, and the thing that they fought for comes about in spite of their defeat, and when it comes, turns out not to be what they meant, and other men have to fight for what they meant under another name."

- William Morris in A DREAM OF JOHN BALL ["The Commonweal Magazine (November 13, 1886); reprinted by Longmans Green and Company, London (1924)].

=============================================================[675]

And for some philosophically uncomfortable reasons, the reciprocity on your part that the contract calls for is never forthcoming. Even walking into a shopping center could be a contract -- if the management so much as posts a notice giving some conditional or qualified use to persons entering therein and accepting the benefits the management is offering (such as requiring shoes and shirts, and so are the arguments of UNFAIRNESS -- that those reciprocal terms of wearing shirts and shoes just don't apply to you because you traveled from just so far away -- as some shopping center security guard throws you out of the place -- is just whimpering). It is actually the continued refusal by Protesters to first see, and then honor, invisible contracts that creates the friction that irritates Protesters so much, and the SILVER BULLET you Protesters are looking for actually lies within yourself.

Remember that your use of those Government highways is your acceptance of a special benefit that Government created and offers, and since reciprocity is expected back in return, contracts are in effect: Automatic and invisible. And one of the ways out of a contract altogether is to prove FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION (meaning that you did not accept any benefit the other party offered). [676]

[676]=============================================================

Another way out is through the preemptive intervention of INTERNATIONAL LAW for those persons having Diplomatic Status through institutions recognized as such by the President of the United States. Another way to get out of a State asserted contract is to be a Federal Employee and start using those highways while engaged in Federal work. In an Opinion written by Mr. Justice Holmes, the Supreme Court once ruled that it is not Constitutionally permissible for a State to throw a slice of regulatory LEX at a Federal Employee driving a motor vehicle on State highways while on Federal business. While touching on the broader recurring question of just what are those frequently overlapping contours of Federal/State legislative jurisdiction, the Supreme Court said that:

"Of course an Employee of the United States does not secure a general immunity from State Law while acting in the course of his Employment. That was decided long ago by Mr. Justice Washington in UNITED STATES VS. HART [Pet. C.C. 390; 5 OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, at 554]. It very well may be that, when the United States has not spoken [here is the RATIFICATION DOCTRINE surfacing again: That silence is sometimes very significant], the subjection to local law would extend to general rules that might affect incidentally the mode of carrying out the Employment -- as, for instance, a statute or ordinance regulating the mode of turning at the corners of streets. COMMONWEALTH VS. CLOSSON, 229 Massachusetts 329. This might stand on much the same footing as liability under the Common Law of a State to a PERSON injured by the driver's negligence. But even the most unquestionable and most universally applicable of state laws, such as those concerning murder, will not be allowed to control the conduct of a Marshal of the United States acting under and in pursuance of the Laws of the United States. IN RE NEAGLE, 135 U.S. 1."

- JOHNSON VS. MARYLAND, 254 U.S. 51, at 56 (1920).

Here in JOHNSON, a Federal Employee was prosecuted for not having a driver's permit, and the Supreme Court annulled the application of that State statute to this Federal Employee. Yes, working for the King does have some peripheral benefits. And as for State statutes not controlling the conduct of the United States Marshal, boy I can just hear some sophomoric Tax Protester, having won perhaps the Governorship of a state, announcing to the world that Residents of that State won't need to concern themselves with the IRS anymore; boy does the King have a few surprises up his sleeve for that clown.

=============================================================[676]

Just how does a PERSON prove FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION when he was caught accepting a benefit by driving down a state highway? The RIGHT TO TRAVEL Cases really don't support the position of you Protesters very well; however, there is some merit in your harmless expression of political dissent, even if the dissent is technically improper (addressing the argument specifically). There is simply no statement anywhere in the RIGHT TO TRAVEL Cases that bluntly restrains the States:

"No state shall require licensing as a condition of use of public thoroughfares."

And since our Founding Fathers never restrained the States in this area, then snickering at judges today who are writing on a record that does not restrain expectations of reciprocity is improvident: That somewhat tranquil era of HORSE AND BUGGIES no longer dominates the highways, where in its place today lies the high-powered automotive technology making its appearance; and also gone from the scene is our Father's old Common Law on basic Property Rights [the right to clean air uncontaminated by automotive exhaust], which has also taken the back seat. [677]

[677]=============================================================

Federal Judge David Bazelon once write a piece touching on an aspect of Technology and of its effect on our Law [COPING WITH TECHNOLOGY THROUGH THE LEGAL PROCESS, 62 Cornell Law Review 817 (1977)]; despite Judge Bazelon's elevated sensitivity to the big environmental picture with the long-term declension seminally originating with Technology, he misses the boat in not defining solutions along re-establishing clean PROPERTY RIGHTS lines that our Fathers once possessed.

=============================================================[677]

Our Founding Fathers never restrained the states from asserting a regulatory jurisdiction over public (Government) highways through an operation of contract. By comparison, the Framers were also negligent in making sure the First Amendment was applicable to all potential future forms of communications media, that an organic technology would bring forth some day, because the First Amendment, frozen in the hard paper media technology of the 1700s, does not apply to restrain the establishment of a regulatory speech and content-supervised jurisdiction over television and radio media propagating through the electromagnetic spectrum, that the King grabbed for himself by his RADIO ACT OF 1927. [678]

[678]=============================================================

In allowing juristic intervention into the assertion of a regulatory jurisdiction over waves propagating through the electromagnetic spectrum, the Supreme Court did not refer to the technology aspect in the historical sense, but justified this intervention on the grounds that there were only a limited number of broadcasting frequencies available for radio and television use, and therefore, we are told, Government must now divide up the pie for us [see NBC VS. UNITED STATES, 319 U.S. 190 (1943)]. Like saying that since the number of printing presses is limited, therefore, the King will allocate newspaper publishing rights -- CLASSICAL GREMLIN REASONING ON RATIONING. Based on this factual premise of frequency scarcity, the radiant liberating qualities of the First Amendment was held not to apply here; but actually the King, as usual, was lying in his arguments to the Supreme Court in justification of this grab [but a successful like requires two, the Supreme Court fell for it]. Down to the present day, there has been nothing but a never ending organic enlargement of the number of frequencies used since the inception of radio transmission, because an organic technology has reduced bandwidth frequencies through increasingly more sophisticated transmission and reception hardware. The frequency bandwidth technology claimed to have been limited in number has, as a factual matter, simply grown to accommodate the demand. Not only are higher frequencies now being used, but several channels are now scrambled onto one frequency bandwidth with multiplexing and demultiplexing taking place at the points of transmission and reception. Therefore, with a regulatory jurisdiction nestled in place, the Federal Communications Commission now has broad authority to determine the right of access to broadcasting. See:

- FEDERAL RADIO COMMISSION VS. NELSON BROTHERS BOND AND MORTGAGE, 289 U.S. 266 (1933);

- FCC VS. POTTSVILLE, 309 U.S. 134 (1940);

- FCC VS. SANDERS BROTHERS RADIO STATION, 309 U.S. 470 (1940);

- FCC VS. ABC, 347 U.S. 284 (1954)].

In 1969, the Supreme Court, continuing on with this incorrect LIMITED NUMBER OF FREQUENCIES line, said that while there is a protected right of everyone to speak, write, or publish as he feels like, subject to very few limitations, there is no comparable right of everyone to broadcast due to limited frequencies [so we are told] -- see RED LION BROADCASTING VS. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). Like Felix Frankfurter would openly admit, judicial competence is quite limited; and just as their COMMON SENSE deficiency manifests itself in many areas, such as this FREQUENCY SHORTAGE line of reasoning, so too does their rare gifted genius also surface in many areas.

=============================================================[678]

And in other areas, technology has eaten away at what would have otherwise been not permissible under the Fourth Amendment. [679]

[679]=============================================================

In 1927, coming out of a Prohibition enforcement action, the United States Supreme Court ruled that wiretapping of telephone lines by Government agents was not protected by the Fourth Amendment. The technological development of the telephone in 1927 was then 50 years old; and the Case portrays an ominous picture of what happens when our Founding Fathers failed to bluntly, specifically, and explicitly tie the King's giblets down tight, in no uncertain terms. Nowhere did our Fathers require the application of the restrainment Principles found in the Bill of Rights to be applied to technology then not existing, even though in 1787 the printing press was a relatively recent technological development. One might think that even in 1787, something might come along not contemplated by the word "Press" in the First Amendment -- but no, our Fathers did not provide for that. Writing initially in WEEMS VS. UNITED STATES, dissenting Justice Louis Brandeis had a few words to say about the inherently organic nature of Constitutions:

"Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from an experience of evils, but its general langua