I N V I S I B L E C O N T R A C T S
George Mercier
INSURANCE PROGRAMS
Through
entry into the juristic highways of Interstate Commerce by
participation
in an insurance policy program, as insurance is
Interstate
Commerce, and the King retains a third party beneficiary
status
in all Commercial transactions that full under his regulatory
Commercial
Jurisdiction penumbra. In 1944, the
Supreme Court decided
a Case
called UNITED STATES VS. SOUTH-EASTERN
UNDERWRITERS
ASSOCIATION,
[632]
[632]
322 U.S. 533 (1944). [632]end
which
held that insurance, all by itself, is Interstate Commerce; so
if you
manage to participate in policies of insurance, you are
participating
in Interstate Commerce; Federal commercial benefits are
being
accepted, and the reciprocal QUID PRO QUO taxation is necessary.
The
fact that the insurance company may be state chartered and
licensed
to do business in only one state, and that the policy may
have
been negotiated, accepted, written, and entered into in only one
state
are not relevant indicia as effecting limitations on federal
Jurisdictions;
PERSONS paying premiums on policies of Insurance are
PERSONS
playing in King's Commerce. A year later
after UNITED STATES
VS. SOUTH-EASTERN UNDERWRITERS ASSOCIATION was
ruled upon, the
Congress
enacted the MCCARREN ACT, [633]
[633]
59 Statutes 33; Title 15, Section 1011 to 1015. [633]end
declaring
that the:
"...
continued regulation and taxation by the several states of
the
business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence
on the
part of Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier
to the
regulation or taxation of such business by the several states."
Yes, even
the Congress of the United States knows that the application
of
PRINCIPLES OF NATURE relating to silence that are incorporated into
the
RATIFICATION DOCTRINE is even held to be binding on them in some
circumstances. This Congressional pronouncement, that
silence in the
context
of a proposition being made constitutes acceptance, applies to
all
appropriate factual settings, and is held to apply to all PERSONS,
even
the Congress itself. But as for
taxation expectations, your
acceptance
of the benefits of an insurance program is deemed as
evidence
of entry into Interstate Commerce, and hence such
participants
are an object suitable for Federal taxation, regardless
of any
political Status, and regardless of the presence or absence of
any
other juristic contract.
I N V I S I B L E C O N T R A C T S
George Mercier
FEDERAL LICENSING
PROGRAMS
By
experiencing the direct benefits of Commercial enrichment acquired
through
a Federal license program, such as being an SEC registered
stockbroker,
or an ATF licensed manufacturer of fireworks, which is an
obvious
pursuit of federally participated profit or gain. Several
federal
monopolies were designed specifically for the existing
participants
to experience intensive Commercial enrichment in, as the
net
effect of a regulatory jurisdiction is to discourage potential new
market
entrants from competing with established corporate titans. In
any
market there are only so many potential customers available, and
excluding
new upstarts allows existing Grandfathers to have a bigger
slice
of the pie they would not otherwise be experiencing. For
example,
the creation of National Banks by the Congress, through the
Comptroller
of the Currency, is one such monopoly designed to enrich
existing
market participants, while shutting out new banks and
damaging
the end consumer. In any one
demographic banking district,
there
is only so much business to be had; cutting out new entrants
keeps a
bigger slice of the banking pie for the owners. [634]
[634]
For example, in 1967, F.W. Pitts wanted
to bring a new National
Bank
into the Hartsville, South Carolina area.
He submitted an
application
to the Comptroller of the Currency for a license
certificate,
and the request was denied. Reason:
"...
we were unable to reach a favorable conclusion as to the
need
factor." - CAMP VS. PITTS, 411
U.S. 138, at 139 (1973). That
is
correct: The Comptroller denied the application because the
community
was already adequately served by other banks, and there was
no
"need," seemingly, for the new proposed national bank. In this
way,
the existing banks in Hartsville shut out a new impending
competitor. The letter from the Comptroller, in turning
down the
License
request, listed the banks already in the Hartsville area and
the
deposits they carried [CAMP, id., at 139].
The Comptroller seemed
to be
very concerned about enhancing the financial enrichment of the
existing
banks; and at no time was there any discussion about the
improved
service the end consumer would be experiencing, or of the
very
competitive rates of interest on loans that new upstarts
searching
for business charge. But like the
tightly regulated
issuance
of local Television Station licenses by the FCC, the
Comptroller
of the Currency is on a mission: To make sure that the
owners
of existing banks are very well fed, and so throwing Torts at
the
public is nothing they are going to concern themselves with. For
a summary
of the laws creating obstacles for new prospective banks to
go into
business, see the Editor's Notes called BANK CHARTERS,
BRANCHING,
HOLDING COMPANY AND MERGER LAWS: COMPETITION FRUSTRATED in
71 Yale
Law Journal 592 (1962). [634]end
The
secondary consequences of restraining the number of new market
entrants
politically are elevated prices the end consumer winds up
paying,
constricted services and retarded technological innovations.
[635]
[635]
The telephone companies have exclusive geographical districts
assigned
to them with no competitors -- a pure monopoly; and if the
FCC had
not intervened to allow third party telephones and other
equipment
to be connected to local telephone company lines, you would
never
have been able to have automatic redialing on your phones --
such
nice little effort savers are the result of competition, and not
your
local phone company, who could care less.
Computers have been
used
extensively for telephone switching since the middle 1960's, and
the continuing
refusal of the phone company to assign a few byte
locations
in their computer's memory to remember your last dialed
number,
occurred for just one reason: They have a monopoly, they have
their
enrichment pipeline set up, and they don't care about you at all
[a
relative statement that will be viewed as being excessively harsh
by
those who never bothered to give any thought to evaluating,
comparatively,
the service attitude manifested by businessmen in a
competitive
operating atmosphere, with those businessmen who don't
need to
concern themselves with competitive pressures.] Yes,
MINIMALISM
rules in all uncompetitive environments, Commercial and
otherwise. [635]end
I N V I S I B L E C O N T R A C T S
George Mercier
STATE CREATED JURISTIC
BENEFITS
7.
By experiencing state created juristic benefits (such as
through
the vehicle of corporations by being
shareholders/directors/officers). In 1910, the Supreme Court ruled
that if
a Prince creates some type of a profit or gain situation in
Commerce
(and remember that King's Commerce is a closed private domain
belonging
to Government), then the King can participate in taxing that
profit
or gain that the Prince created. [636]
[636]
This Principle was applied to an Income Tax collection setting
in
FLINT VS. STONE TRACY COMPANY, 220
U.S. 108 (1910). [636]end
When
state created benefits are accepted by you, then the Commercial
enrichment
you experience within that state franchise is very much
within
the taxing power of the United States Government; and that is
correct
Law. [637]
[637]
"While the tax in this case, as we have construed the statute,
is
imposed upon the exercise of the privilege of doing business under
a
corporate capacity, as such business is done under authority of
state
franchises, it becomes necessary to consider in this connection
the
right of the Federal Government to tax the activities of private
corporations
which arise from the exercise of franchises granted by
the
state in creating and conferring powers upon such corporations.
We
think it is the result of the cases heretofore decided in this
court,
that such business activities, though exercised because of
state
created franchises, are not beyond the taxing power of the
United
States. Taxes upon rights exercised
under grants of state
franchise
were sustained by this court in RAILROAD COMPANY VS.
COLLECTOR,
100 U.S. 595 (1879); UNITED STATES
VS. ERIE RAILROAD, 106
U.S. 327 (1882).
[See also 106 U.S., page 703 for opinions by
Justices
Bradley and Harlan]; SPRECKLES SUGAR REFINING COMPANY VS.
MCCLAIN,
192 U.S. 397 (1 903)." - FLINT
VS. STONE TRACY COMPANY, 220
U.S. 108, at 155 (1910). [637]end
Additionally,
the King can tax other state created Commercial benefits
that
are experienced by others like attorneys and accountants who, as
Special
Interest Groups, use the police powers of the state for their
own
private enrichment, by setting up shared monopolies and then
experiencing
higher revenues than otherwise obtainable under a
LAISSEZ-FAIRE
free market entry without restrictions on new lower
priced
competitors entering into their trade.
[638]
[638]
The objective of monopolies is to make money, they are
enrichment
oriented legal devices benefiting their members; the story
told by
members of the monopoly, deflecting the existential reasoning
off to
the side with sweet sounding lies that portray their monopoly's
bleeding
heart objectives as merely being just pure concerns of public
welfare
and QUALITY, are fraudulent. For a
protracted and thorough
discussion
on the negative quality side effects of professional trade
licensing,
on how they fail their stated purposes [meaning that their
purposes
were fraudulently stated at the time of monopoly creation]
and are
counter-productive in a wide-ranging array of areas, and for a
history
of licensing, see David B. Hogan in THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
LICENSING:
HISTORY, EVIDENCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 7 Law and Human
Behavior
117 (1983). Numerous other articles in
the September, 1983
issue
of LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR explain why quality necessarily
degenerates
in that inherently uncompetitive atmosphere that
characterizes
shared monopolies. In the old English
Case of DAVENPORT
AND
HURDIS [11 Coke 86], the court there refers to the increase in
prices
and deterioration in quality and commodities, which necessarily
results
from the granting monopolies [see THE SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES,
83
U.S. 36, at 103 (1872).]
"In practice, such
[regulatory] restrictions frequently are
designed
to give some profession or occupation monopoly power. It is,
for
example, very difficult to argue that most professional licensure
laws
are primarily concerned with quality control [see Stigler in THE
THEORY
OF ECONOMIC REGULATION, 2 Bell Journal of Economic and
Management
Science 3, at 13 (1971)]. Simple
restrictions on the
number
of market participants are also generally explicit grants of
monopoly
power to a limited group. While limits
on the number of
taxicabs
in a city may reduce traffic congestion, they also benefit
license
holders [see Kitch in THE REGULATION OF TAXICABS IN CHICAGO,
14
Journal of Law and Economics 285 (1971)." - Susan Ross Adams in
INALIENABILITY
AND THE THEORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS, 85 Columbia Law
Review
931 (1985). [638]
This
game of using penal statutes to create shared enrichment
monopolies
is quite old, and yet look around you today and see how
many
bleeding heart folks there are, who really want to believe that
line
that Government is their friend, just somehow; and also fall for
the
fraudulent line that such a monopoly is for their own protective
good --
by keeping all those evil quacks, vile frauds, and assorted
degenerate
incompetents out of the legal and medical professions.
[639]
[639]
Never mind the fact that before the Professions were
monopolized,
folks had to check references and exercise business
judgment,
as in any other business arrangement where you are dealing
with
unacquainted people. Today, the mere
fact that licenses are in
force
automatically precludes much inquisitive background questioning
that
should still be asked -- Government has assumed the role of
qualifier
for you; and many persons holding licenses, when asked of
their
qualifications, refuse to give references and merely point
attention
over to that license -- dealing with such a person,
shrouding
his business background behind a veil of secrecy, is
improvident. A prime example lies in the regulatory
jurisdiction
asserted
over securities and related Commercial investment instruments
-- the
mere fact that Government has conducted a searching probe
called
FULL DISCLOSURE (a fraudulent characterization since much
material
is forbidden to be included in a PROSPECTUS), automatically
reduces
normal intensity questioning by prospective investors; and so
as a
result, investors are pre-emptively deprived of the ability to
collect
facts, exercise a risk/yield assessment judgment, and then
make a
risk investment -- Government is really your friend when
stripping
you of the important learning ability to acquire judgment
experientially
[try to ask a corporate officer for additional
information
not contained in that PROSPECTUS their lawyers wrote -- he
won't
give you any, since it is illegal; some big friend Government
is]. Persons placing overriding priority on the
perceived important
function
of protecting the public financially from investment con
artists
or investments without merit, to justify depriving other
people
of the exercise of their own comparative investiture placement
judgment
and the benefit of acquiring real intrinsic knowledge
experientially,
are manufacturing unnecessary Torts they will later
regret,
as the purpose of this Second Estate is exclusively
intellectual. And any operation of Government which
impairs or
attempts
to impede the acquisition of factual knowledge or the
unrestricted
flow of information between Individuals, is literally a
Doctrine
of Devils. And as for MD's, if licensed
medical doctors know
what
they are doing as well, then why is it that whenever they go on
strike,
the death rate drops? [I am reminded of
the circumstances
that
King Louis the 15th went through, when he was a small infant. He
had contracted
chicken pox, and an attending nurse hid him from the
French
medical profession to spare his life; doctors had previously
killed
Louis's brother and father during treatment].
[639]end
Although
we might not be too philosophically sympathetic with the
manipulative
use of Legislatures to create monopolies and the
Tortfeasance
that is thrown at us in the adverse secondary
circumstances
flowing from their operations, as a matter of law,
creating
game rules for voluntary players in King's Commerce is
largely
immune from Constitutional restrainments.
[640]
[640]
"... and although we have no
direct constitutional provision
against
a monopoly, yet the whole theory of a free Government is
opposed
to such grants, and it does not require even the aid which may
be
derived from the Bill of Rights [of Connecticut], the first section
of
which declares that 'no man or set of men, are entitled to
exclusive
public emoluments, or privileges from the community' to
render
them void. The statute of 21 James I.,
C. 3, which declares
such
monopolies to be contrary to law and void, except as to patents
for a
limited time, and printing, the regulation of which was at that
time
considered as belonging to the king's prerogative, and except
also,
certain warlike materials and manufactures, the regulation of
which
for obvious reasons may fairly be said to belong to the king,
has
always been considered as merely declaratory of the common law." -
NORWICH
GAS VS. NORWICH CITY GAS, 25
Connecticut Reporter 19, at 38
(1856)
[CONNECTICUT REPORT carries the Cases from the Connecticut
Supreme
Court.]
See
also the briefs for Counsel in THE SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES [83 U.S.
36
(1872)] as they contain a great deal of legal material in
opposition
to monopolies [6 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE
SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at 475, by
Kurland
and Casper [University Publications, Arlington, Virginia
(1975)]. The Supreme Court in THE SLAUGHTER-HOUSE
CASES discusses the
great
CASE OF MONOPOLIES, decided during the reign of Queen Elizabeth
which
held that all monopolies, in any known trade or manufacture, are
an
invasion of the liberty of the Citizens to acquire property, and
pursue
happiness, and were declared void at Common Law, which is
correct
reasoning when applied to appropriate Tort Law factual
settings
lying outside of any participation in that closed private
domain
of King's Commerce. [THE
SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES addressed the
question
as to whether or not monopolies were forbidden by the 13th
Amendment
and several clauses in the 14th Amendment, by reason of the
damages
they c reate on Citizens]. [640]end
In
France in the 1600s, Finance Minister Jean Colbert once wrote a
CODE OF
COMMERCE [sometimes called the CODE SAVARY (1673)]. The Code
created
controlled entrance guilds, and laid down rules for
apprenticeship
and admissions of masters. An extensive
number of
trades
were so regulated by the Code, and once entrance into those
guilds
was restricted [i.e., the number of possible competitors was
restricted],
then the demand for taxes immediately appeared:
"Each new guild was to pay certain
sums for the granting to it of
statutes
and regulations..."
"Colbert raised money from the
organization and reorganization of
the
guilds... and made of them before the
century was out congealing
monopolies
which the state [wanted], because revenue could be raised
from
them." [641]
[641]
COLBERT'S LIFE AND THEORIES, Volume I, page 309 and Volume II,
page
457 [Columbia University Press (1939)].
[641]end
As a
general rule, money raising statutes that generate enrichment for
the
Crown never die; and down to the present day, a portion of the
Commercial
law of France remains based on the 122 Articles of
Colbert's
CODE OF COMMERCE. [642]
[642]
Levasseur, HISTORIE DE COMMERCE, I, 299-300.
[642]end
But
here in the contemporary United States, once a state has got you
tied
into a licensing program of some type, then and there you are
experiencing
some type of state created juristic benefit, and as such,
you
then become a federal taxable object for this benefit accepting
reason
alone. When presented with such a state
license, no other
questions
about the existence of the National Citizenship Contract, or
any other
juristic contract, ever need be asked by those termites in
the IRS
searching the Countryside for some meat to lay into. [643]
[643]
Here in New York State, for example, Section 441(1)(d) of the
Real
Property Law defines individuals who are eligible to apply for,
and
receive, state licenses for the sale and brokerage of real estate.
Licenses
are granted freely to either Citizens of the United States,
or to
aliens; once a license to experience financial enrichment in a
shared
business monopoly has been issued, the state does not care
about
your political relational status to the King, or any associated
benefits
accepted thereby. With such a license
in effect, for taxing
purposes,
your Prince has you tied down but good and tight. [643]end
Other
state monopolies like Driver's Licenses and motor vehicle
registrations
are very much used by the IRS in many ways to assist
them in
tax collections; and state tax collectors also use these
records
for their own statute enforcement and state treasury
enrichment
conquests as well. When those Driver's
License records are
collected
by the state, they are also forwarded to Washington, and
then
redistributed to foreign persons and foreign political
jurisdictions
under numerous executive agreements, diplomatic and
military
treaties, and bureaucratic cordialities.
Yet,
even though you entered into those state licenses merely to avoid
your
incarceration as an unlicensed driver, the uncontested
preparation
of a state created juristic personality, such through a
Driver's
License, to the Supreme Court would be prospectively
sufficient
for that Court to attach IN PERSONAM liability to Title 26
as a
Person accepting special state created benefits. [644]
[644]
"Whatever a state may forbid or regulate it may permit upon
condition
that a fee be paid in return for the privilege. And such a
fee may
be exacted to discourage the prosecution of a business or to
adjust
competitive or economic inequalities.
Taxation may be made the
implement
of the exercise of the state's police powers." - ATLANTIC &
PACIFIC
TEA COMPANY VS. GROSJEAN, 301 U.S. 412, at 426 (1936).
[644]end
It is
also reasonable to infer that a Driver's License is evidence of
Residency,
and of the acceptance of a wide-ranging array of state
benefits
tailored to Residents. Remember that
your use of those
highways
is your acceptance of a benefit that Government created, and
since
reciprocity is expected back in return, contracts are in effect:
Invisible
and automatic. [645]
[645]
And the pronouncements of Highway Contract Protesters, arguing
that
Highway Contracts do not exist until the Driver's License
application
itself has been signed, is defective reasoning, as I will
explain
later. [645]end
If you
do so file objections to the assertion of a Beneficent Taxable
Juristic
Commercial Status over you by way of a Driver's License, you
will
need to again prove your present STATE OF MIND; and the exact
state
code criminalizing such innocuous behavior has to be quoted
within
the body of your Objection. Some folks
prefer to play it safe
and
avoid the Driver's License altogether; while others selectively
use
deception in assuming a NOM DE PLUME for purposes of deflecting
recourse
identification. [646]
[646]
Judges often have a difficult time ruling on the question as to
whether
or not an assumed name was fraudulently used to deceive other
people. The reason why this difficulty is inherent
with assumed names
is due
to the Common Law right of anyone to assume any name they feel
like,
how and when they feel like it, and without any petition to
Government
for such an assumption of a NOM DE PLUME.
See UNITED
STATES
VS. COX, 593 F.2nd 46 (1979), and
UNITED STATES VS. WASMAN,
484
F.Supp. 54 (1979), for Cases where
Federal Judges wrestled quite
a bit
with this question. [646]end
However,
other folks are not able to so quickly terminate the Driver's
License
due to the fundamental importance of the thing and either
their
present inability to successfully handle a criminal prosecution
or
their reluctance to assign something deleterious to it; and so at a
minimum,
an Objection and a DECLARATORY JUDGMENT TO QUIET STATUS
originated
in Federal District Court is in order.
The Declaratory
Judgment,
ruling that the Driver's License was a COMPELLED LICENSE,
existing
as a coerced instrument signed by you to avoid incarceration
as an
unlicensed driver, and is not to be used by the IRS or anyone
else
for the expansive purposes of evidence of either Residency or of
Domiciliary,
nor as evidence of entrance into Commerce, or of the
taxable
acceptance of federal or state created benefits, or of consent
to be
bound by any statute, other than those state motor vehicle
statutes. The objective of our pursuit of a Declaratory
Judgment is:
That
since the license was compelled out of us when some DE MINIM IS
tension
is in effect with a Substantive Right (the RIGHT TO TRAVEL),
and
since the avowed purpose of the license itself is to adduce
EVIDENCE
OF COMPETENCY, then the extraneous collateral expectations of
reciprocity
in any area outside of those Motor Vehicle Statutes it
would
otherwise create when left unchallenged, is now terminated.
[647]
[647]
The DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL is slightly different from
COLLATERAL
ESTOPPEL in that EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL precludes a litigant
who
wrongfully induced another to adversely change his position from
asserting
a right or defense, which is what happens when IRS termites
start
chopping away at the off-point benefits derived from a State
License
acquired solely to avoid penal consequences, under tension
with a
Substantive Right:
"...
the effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is
absolutely
precluded, both at law and in equity, from asserting rights
which
might perhaps have otherwise existed, either of property, of
contract,
or of remedy, as against another person, who has in good
faith
relied upon such conduct, and has been led thereby to change his
position
for the worse, and who on his part acquires some
corresponding
right, either of property, of contract, or of remedy." -
J.
Pomeroy in 3 EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, Section 804 95th Edition
(1941)].
Traditionally,
Courts have been reluctant to hold the operation of
this
Doctrine against the Government. [See
generally ESTOPPEL AGAINST
STATE,
COUNTY, AND CITY in 23 Washington Law Review 51 (1948)].
Consequently,
since Government is let off the responsibility hook,
people
with claims against the Government have often suffered wrongs
unnecessarily
that Courts would not have tolerated had both litigants
been
non-juristic parties; yet things have been loosening up a bit
since
the OIL SHALE CASES [see EMERGENCE OF AN EQUITABLE DOCTRINE OF
ESTOPPEL
AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT -- THE OIL SHALE CASES in 46
University
of Colorado Law Review 433 (1975)]. In
1981, the Supreme
Court
seemed willing to entertain the use of this EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
DOCTRINE
against the Government in SCHWEIKER VS.
HANSEN [see
EQUITABLE
ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT by Deborah Eisen, in 67
Cornell
Law Review 609 (1982)]. [647]
If you
are going to Object to, and have new narrow contours now
defined
on your Driver's License in order to restrain its use by other
Government
agencies as the high-powered King's Equity attachment
instrument
that it is, then the Objection should generally follow the
model
pattern set forth above in the discussion of Federal Reserve
Notes. This Objection should refer to the exact
state penal statute
that
you are applying for the license under Objection and protest,
merely
to avoid incarceration as an unlicensed driver. [648]
[648]
Contracts entered into where arrest was threatened are coercive,
and are
wide open to attack. Read the story of
the finding of the
sunken
lost Spanish Galleon ship, the ATOCHA, and the subsequent
muscle
threats by the State of Florida to arrest the underwater
treasure
hunters if they didn't agree to turn over a percentage of
their
treasure finds to the Florida Prince, in the STATE OF FLORIDA
VS. TREASURE SALVORS, INC. [458 U.S.
670 (1980)]. Footnote number
4
refers to the Federal District Court in Florida that ruled that
those
contracts so signed were coercive. [If
the treasure hunters
were
smart, they would have filed a REJECTION OF POLICE POWER BENEFITS
with
the State of Florida, and then present the Judiciary with an
entirely
different factual setting to rule on.
Maybe the Treasure
Hunters
wanted the protectorate benefits of the guns and cages offered
by the
State; if so, then they should have tendered the reciprocity so
expected.]
[648]end
Remember
that the Supreme Court is in Washington, and you are out in
California,
Florida, or Texas, and it is unreasonable for you to
assume
that the Supreme Court knows the state statute that you are
Objecting
to, so quote it for them verbatim. How
can you engage in
involuntary
behavior based on threats contained in a state statute, if
you
don't even know what the statute says?
[649]
[649]
When addressing an evidentiary question -- such as the
appropriateness
of assigning BURDENS OF PROOF to either Government or
the
Individual, under circumstances where the Individual does not want
to do
something but penal statutes intervene to change his reluctance
--
Justice Frankfurter once said that:
"Where an individual engages in
conduct by command of a penal
statute... to whose laws he is subject, the gravest
doubt is case on
the
applicability of the normal assumption -- even in a prosecution
for
murder (see LELAND VS. OREGON, 343
U.S. 790) -- that what a
person
does, he does of his own free will.
When a consequence as
drastic
as [enfranchisement] may be the effect of such conduct, it is
not
inappropriate that the Government should be charged with proving
that
the Citizen's conduct was a response, not to the command of the
statute,
but to his own direction. The ready
provability of the
critical
fact -- existence of an applicable [penal] law, particularly
a
criminal law, commanding the act in question -- provides protection
against
shifting the burden to the Government on the basis of a
frivolous
assertion of the defense of duress.
Accordingly, the
Government
should, under the circumstances of this case, have the
burden
of proving by clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence that
the
Citizen volun tarily performed an act causing [enfranchisement]."
-
Justice Frankfurter in NISHIKAWA VS.
DULLES, 356 U.S. 129, at 141
(1957).
The
actual factual circumstances in NISHIKAWA involved similar Tort
questions
of the unfairness of involuntary expatriation when a
Citizenship
Contract is hanging in the background.
[649]end
If you
are just too busy to go down to the law library and find out
the
exact wording of that penal statute, I have no sympathy for any
rebuffment
that you will experience later on as some appellate forum
rules
adversely against you, on the grounds that your STATE OF MIND
was not
clarified substantively or timely. Also
included should be a
brief
recap of the RIGHT TO TRAVEL Cases in the United States Supreme
Court. [650]
[650]
Such
as:
- EDWARDS VS. CALIFORNIA, 314 U.S. 160
- TWINING VS NEW JERSEY, 211 U.S. 78
- WILLIAMS VS. FEARS, 179 U.S. 270, AT 274
- CRANDALL VS. NEVADA, 6 WALL. 35, AT
43-44
- THE PASSENGER CASES, 7 HOWARD 287, AT
492
- U.S. VS. GUEST, 383 U.S. 745, AT 757-758
(1966)
- GRIFFIN VS. BRECKENRIDGE, 403 U.S. 88,
AT 105-106 (1971)
- CALIFANO VS. TORRES, 435 U.S. 1, AT 4,
note 6
- SHAPIRO VS. THOMPSON, 394 U.S. 618
(1969)
- CALIFANO VS. AZNAVORIAN, 439 U.S. 170,
AT 176 (1978)
All of
which were cited in ALEXANDER HAIG VS.
CIA AGENT PHILIP AGEE,
435
U.S. 280, at 306 (1980), which
reaffirmed the RIGHT TO TRAVEL
within
the United States, and then distinguished that Right from the
lessor
administrative "freedom" to travel outside the TERRA FIRMA of
the
United States as being discretionary, within reasonable limits, by
the
King over his Subjects, as all "Citizens" are operating under the
administrative
jurisdiction of contractual King's Equity.
See also a
separate
but parallel FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT DOCTRINE; and UNITED STATES
VS. LAUB, 385 U.S. 475 (1966); and THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL: THE PASSPORT
PROBLEM
by Louis Jaffee in 35 Foreign Affairs, at 17 (October, 1956)
which
discusses, at a light level, the national interest implications
involved
when the RIGHT TO TRAVEL is under tension with statutes.
[650]end
Patriots
and Highway Protesters are reaching incorrect conclusions
when
they cite the RIGHT TO TRAVEL Cases as being sufficiently
substantive
to annul state statutes requiring highway operator's
licenses. Those RIGHT TO TRAVEL Cases only offer a
line of reasoning
parallel
with your objectives. Only in loose
DICTA does the reasoning
found
in the RIGHT TO TRAVEL Cases support your position; so they
offer a
mitigating source of relief against state statutes, but not a
necessarily
vitiating source of relief. Nowhere did
our Founding
Fathers
restrain the states from requiring licenses to operate motor
vehicles
or anything else on public highways, and the words RIGHT TO
TRAVEL
do not even appear anywhere in the Constitution. [651]
[651]
Remember the word PUBLIC, as used by Judges, generally means
GOVERNMENT. When appellate judges use the words AFFECTS
A PUBLIC
INTEREST
to justify some further state intervention somewhere, what
they
mean is that a Government interest is affected. As applied to
Highway
law, partial justification for the state judicial affirmance
of the
requirement to hold an operator's license is the fact that the
regulatory
jurisdiction the State Legislature is asserting over those
highways
does, in fact, "affect a Governmental interest," as it is the
state
that spends the money to acquire the land, build the highway,
and
then spends incredible amounts of more money, year in and year out
without
any let up, to maintain those roads. If
that does not affect
a
Governmental interest, then would someone explain just what would?
[651]end
And
although the words RIGHT TO TRAVEL do not appear anywhere in the
Constitution,
the Supreme Court has, through their Opinions, given
that
right Constitutional status cognizance.
[652]
[652]
"...[The] right finds no explicit mention in the Constitution.
The
reason, it has been suggested, is that a right so elementary was
conceived
from the beginning to be a necessary concomitant of the
stronger
Union the Constitution created. In any
even, freedom to
travel
throughout the United States has long been recognized as a
basic
right under the Constitution. ... The constitutional right to
travel
from one State to another... occupies a
position fundamental
to the
concept of our Federal Union. It is a
right that has been
firmly
established and repeatedly recognized." - UNITED STATES VS.
GUEST,
383 U.S. 745, at 757 et seq. (1966) [Sentences were quoted
out of
order].
Although
that statement is correct, it only applies to INTERSTATE
traveling. Protesting Patriots suggesting that
fraudulent factual
averments
of INTERSTATE traveling be adduced as defensive instruments
in
local traffic prosecution arguments, as I have heard, are
improvident
-- the selective incorporation of deception into your
MODUS
OPERANDI will only postpone the day of arrival for that SILVER
BULLET
which Highway Contract Protesters are searching for, a bullet
which
lies within yourselves. [652]end
But
whatever DE MINIMIS protective penumbra the RIGHT TO TRAVEL Cases
offers,
you are now invoking to abate both your regional Prince and
the
King's Tax Collectors who use Department of Motor Vehicle
information
and legal assumptions that information infers for their
own
enrichment purposes. In this
circumstantial context of submitting
a
carefully pre-planned and prepared written Objection, where time is
not of
the essence, failure to cite your authorities (failure to
explain
your justifications) timely could be fatal.
You are up
against
high-powered adversaries, and lightly drafting papers, as if
you
were on a picnic, is fatal. Judges do
not owe you Justice aligned
with
your philosophy; those are adversary court proceedings you are
in,
where mere preponderance wins, and an insubstantive Objection is
open to
attack. (And remember that a RIGHT TO
TRAVEL also lies
outside
of, and beyond the reach of, the King's Charter (the
Constitution). [653]
[653]
Does the following restrainment on Government appear any place
in the
Constitution?...
"The streets belong to the public in
the ordinary way. Their use
for
purposes of gain is special and extraordinary, and generally at
least,
may be prohibited or conditioned as the legislature deems
proper."
- PACKARD VS. BARTON, 264 U.S. 140, at 144 (1923). [653]end
Some
judicial forms from another era have applied the LIBERTY CLAUSE
in the
Fifth Amendment to restrain the interference by the FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT
in the RIGHT TO TRAVEL area (but keep in mind that those
Cases
were ruled upon in an era when automobiles and other
high-powered
technology did not exist in the United States, and
highway
contracts WITH STATES did not exist then, as well). [654]
[654]
"The right to travel is part of the "liberty" of which the
Citizen
cannot be deprived of, without due process of law under the
Fifth
Amendment... Freedom of movement across
frontiers... and
inside
frontiers as well, was part of our heritage..." - KENT VS.
DULLES,
357 U.S. 116, at 125 (1958). [654]end
So your
objective in having the contours of the Driver's License
restrained
to now apply only to Highway Contract grievances, the RIGHT
TO
TRAVEL being claimed is both of a Constitutional origin, as well as
of a
Natural origin, ex-Constitutional.
[655]
[655]
The Supreme Court once ruled that the RIGHT TO TRAVEL interstate
overruled
State arguments of social or economic consequences:
"The right to interstate travel had
long been recognized as a
right
of constitutional significance, and the Court's decision,
therefore,
did not require an AD HOC determination as to the social or
economic
importance of that right." - SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT VS.
RODRIGUEZ,
411 U.S. 1, at 32 (1973). [655]end
But
important for the moment is the Objection itself, and your
Declaration
therein that you are not a Resident or a Citizen of that
State
together with correlative supporting averments of Benefit
Rejections,
[656]
[656]
Remember that Residency contracts are presumed to be in effect,
and
contracts have to be attacked for substantive reasons, such as
FAILURE
OF CONSIDERATION, and do not roll over and die by your mere
unilateral
declarations of their nonexistence.
[656]end
regardless
of any statute that facially appears to force Residency
Status
on persons physically inhabited in that state for an extended
period
of time. [657]
[657]
In certain pleading contexts, there is not a lot of legal
difference
between a DOMICILIARY and a RESIDENT.
In HAMMERSTEIN VS.
LYNEE
[200 Federal 165 (1912)], a Federal District Court ruled that
the
word RESIDE in the 14th Amendment's State Citizenship Clause also
meant
DOMICILIARY. One of the characteristics
of the English Language
is the
lack of identity of some of the words that comprise its
structure;
many words have found multiple homes in different
locations,
and therefore meanings must be abated pending consideration
of an
enlarged context of the surrounding words.
RESIDENCE and
DOMICILE
are two such words in Law that, on some occasions, are
interchangeable,
and on other occasions, are not interchangeable. The
recurring
semantic nature of some words [that Judges are partly
responsible
for since they continuously refuse to define explicit
meanings]
to be inherently difficult broncos to tie down, was noted
once by
a Federal Court, when dealing with a DOMICILIARY question:
"The theoretical domicile which is
equivalent to State Citizenship
is
always one which exists ANIMO REVERTENDI [meaning WITH INTENTION TO
REVERT
BACK]. The theoretical domicile which
clings to a homeless
wanderer,
who never intends to return, has its uses in deciding rights
of
succession to property, in respect to taxation and to the
administration
of pauper laws, but is not, I think, equivalent to
Citizenship
in the sense in which the word "citizen" is used in the
Judiciary
Act. While domicile, in some sense, may
not be lost by mere
departure
with intent not to return, State Citizenship is thus lost.
In
other words, where the word "domicile" is used as meaning home,
where
absence from domicile is AMINO REVERTENDI, domicile may be
equivalent
to State Citizenship; but where domicile exists merely by
legal
fiction, and absence is accompanied by intent never to return to
the
state of domicile, the word is not synonymous with Citizenship." -
PANNIL
VS. ROANOKE TIMES COMPANY, 252 Federal
910, at 915 (1918).
Therefore,
correctly pleading Supreme Court rulings on the purely
voluntary
nature of Citizenship is suggested, and that you are an
Inhabitant
of that State WITHOUT JURISTIC BENEFITS, and neither a
Resident
nor a Domiciliary BENEFIT ACCEPTANT; but your self-proclaimed
status
as an INHABITANT means nothing until you first reject all state
constitutional
benefits, and the benefits of Residency, and the police
protectorate
powers, in particular. [657]end
But if
your Objection does conform to this model, then a Judge
generally
will be reluctant to hold the spurious unrelated reciprocity
terms of
a Commercial contract (which Driver's Licenses can be applied
to
operate as a Commercial Enfranchisement Instrument under some
limited
circumstances) against a person, in a setting other than the
originally
specified terms, who has proved that they entered into that
contract
under compelled circumstances in order to avoid incarceration
merely
to enjoy a Substantive natural Right (the RIGHT TO TRAVEL), and
without
experiencing any Commercial benefit therefrom.
[658]
[658]
State Residency statutes were once overruled by the Supreme
Court
on grounds relating to RIGHT TO TRAVEL.
In SHAPIRO VS.
THOMPSON
[394 U.S. 618 (1969)], the Supreme
Court ruled that the
INTERSTATE
right to travel overruled and annulled state residency
statutes
[where welfare grants offered by States restricted to persons
living
in that kingdom for at least one year, where annulled. This is
a
unique case in the sense that its reasoning will never surface
anywhere
else, as the claimed "chilling effect" the state residency
statutes
generated on the Interstate Right to Travel represented one
of
philosophical justification. Substitute
the same "chilling effect"
RIGHT
TO TRAVEL reasoning on any other Patriot state residency
Protester
case, and the Federal Judge will snort at you.
[658]end
That is
the type of an Objection the Supreme Court wants to hear. The
documentation
and proof that the Supreme Court would want to see is a
copy of
the application for the Driver's License where it says you
signed
it under protest; proof of service of your Objection on state
officials,
the Objection itself, and a 30-day invitation to those
state
officials to let them cancel or rescind the Driver's License if
the
application of Commercial Status and/or Residency Status is deemed
mandatory
on all License holders (thus requiring those state officials
to come
out of the closet and expose some Status oriented law to you
they
might not want you to know). Under your
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT,
the
Driver's License will be construed to act exclusively as EVIDENCE
OF
COMPETENCY under Motor Vehicle statutes only.
[659]
[659]
"Automobile licenses are issued periodically to evidence that
the
drivers holding them are sufficiently familiar with the rules of
the
road and are physically qualified to operate a motor vehicle." -
DELAWARE
VS. PROUSE, 440 U.S. 648, at 658 (1978). [659]end