I N V I S I B L E C O N T R A C T S

George Mercier

STATE CREATED JURISTIC BENEFITS

Many folks out there are searching for a SILVER BULLET; I hear

references to that perennial search constantly. They are searching

for some legal procedure, some great air-tight line of reasoning, some

great legal brief that just ties it all together, to throw at the IRS

and Traffic Court judges. These folks are missing the boat, so to

speak, all together: Because the origin to their frustration lies in

invisible contracts, and you become a party to those invisible

contracts because you accepted some benefit someone else was

conditionally offering. [675]

[675] "Men fight and lose the battle, and the thing that they fought

for comes about in spite of their defeat, and when it comes, turns out

not to be what they meant, and other men have to fight for what they

meant under another name." - William Morris in A DREAM OF JOHN BALL

["The Commonweal Magazine (November 13, 1886); reprinted by Longmans

Green and Company, London (1924)]. [675]end

And for some philosophically uncomfortable reasons, the reciprocity on

your part that the contract calls for is never forthcoming. Even

walking into a shopping center could be a contract -- if the

management so much as posts a notice giving some conditional or

qualified use to persons entering therein and accepting the benefits

the management is offering (such as requiring shoes and shirts, and so

are the arguments of UNFAIRNESS -- that those reciprocal terms of

wearing shirts and shoes just don't apply to you because you traveled

from just so far away -- as some shopping center security guard throws

you out of the place -- is just whimpering). It is actually the

continued refusal by Protesters to first see, and then honor,

invisible contracts that creates the friction that irritates

Protesters so much, and the SILVER BULLET you Protesters are looking

for actually lies within yourself.

Remember that your use of those Government highways is your acceptance

of a special benefit that Government created and offers, and since

reciprocity is expected back in return, contracts are in effect:

Automatic and invisible. And one of the ways out of a contract

altogether is to prove FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION (meaning that you did

not accept any benefit the other party offered). [676]

[676] Another way out is through the preemptive intervention of

INTERNATIONAL LAW for those persons having Diplomatic Status through

institutions recognized as such by the President of the United States.

Another way to get out of a State asserted contract is to be a Federal

Employee and start using those highways while engaged in Federal work.

In an Opinion written by Mr. Justice Holmes, the Supreme Court once

ruled that it is not Constitutionally permissible for a State to throw

a slice of regulatory LEX at a Federal Employee driving a motor

vehicle on State highways while on Federal business. While touching

on the broader recurring question of just what are those frequently

overlapping contours of Federal/State legislative jurisdiction, the

Supreme Court said that:

"Of course an Employee of the United States does not secure a

general immunity from State Law while acting in the course of his

Employment. That was decided long ago by Mr. Justice Washington in

UNITED STATES VS. HART [Pet. C.C. 390; 5 OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY

GENERAL, at 554]. It very well may be that, when the United States

has not spoken [here is the RATIFICATION DOCTRINE surfacing again:

That silence is sometimes very significant], the subjection to local

law would extend to general rules that might affect incidentally the

mode of carrying out the Employment -- as, for instance, a statute or

ordinance regulating the mode of turning at the corners of streets.

COMMONWEALTH VS. CLOSSON, 229 Massachusetts 329. This might stand on

much the same footing as liability under the Common Law of a State to

a PERSON injured by the driver's negligence. But even the most

unquestionable and most universally applicable of state laws, such as

those concerning murder, will not be allowed to control the conduct of

a Marshal of the United States acting under and in pursuance of the

Laws of the United States. IN RE NEAGLE, 135 U.S. 1." - JOHNSON VS.

MARYLAND, 254 U.S. 51, at 56 (1920).

Here in JOHNSON, a Federal Employee was prosecuted for not having a

driver's permit, and the Supreme Court annulled the application of

that State statute to this Federal Employee. Yes, working for the

King does have some peripheral benefits. And as for State statutes

not controlling the conduct of the United States Marshal, boy I can

just hear some sophomoric Tax Protester, having won perhaps the

Governorship of a state, announcing to the world that Residents of

that State won't need to concern themselves with the IRS anymore; boy

does the King have a few surprises up his sleeve for that clown.

[676]end

Just how does a PERSON prove FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION when he was

caught accepting a benefit by driving down a state highway? The RIGHT

TO TRAVEL Cases really don't support the position of you Protesters

very well; however, there is some merit in your harmless expression of

political dissent, even if the dissent is technically improper

(addressing the argument specifically). There is simply no statement

anywhere in the RIGHT TO TRAVEL Cases that bluntly restrains the

States:

"No state shall require licensing as a condition of use of public

thoroughfares."

And since our Founding Fathers never restrained the States in this

area, then snickering at judges today who are writing on a record that

does not restrain expectations of reciprocity is improvident: That

somewhat tranquil era of HORSE AND BUGGIES no longer dominates the

highways, where in its place today lies the high-powered automotive

technology making its appearance; and also gone from the scene is our

Father's old Common Law on basic Property Rights [the right to clean

air uncontaminated by automotive exhaust], which has also taken the

back seat. [677]

[677] Federal Judge David Bazelon once write a piece touching on an

aspect of Technology and of its effect on our Law [COPING WITH

TECHNOLOGY THROUGH THE LEGAL PROCESS, 62 Cornell Law Review 817

(1977)]; despite Judge Bazelon's elevated sensitivity to the big

environmental picture with the long-term declension seminally

originating with Technology, he misses the boat in not defining

solutions along re-establishing clean PROPERTY RIGHTS lines that our

Fathers once possessed. [677]end

Our Founding Fathers never restrained the states from asserting a

regulatory jurisdiction over public (Government) highways through an

operation of contract. By comparison, the Framers were also negligent

in making sure the First Amendment was applicable to all potential

future forms of communications media, that an organic technology would

bring forth some day, because the First Amendment, frozen in the hard

paper media technology of the 1700s, does not apply to restrain the

establishment of a regulatory speech and content-supervised

jurisdiction over television and radio media propagating through the

electromagnetic spectrum, that the King grabbed for himself by his

RADIO ACT OF 1927. [678]

[678] In allowing juristic intervention into the assertion of a

regulatory jurisdiction over waves propagating through the

electromagnetic spectrum, the Supreme Court did not refer to the

technology aspect in the historical sense, but justified this

intervention on the grounds that there were only a limited number of

broadcasting frequencies available for radio and television use, and

therefore, we are told, Government must now divide up the pie for us

[see NBC VS. UNITED STATES, 319 U.S. 190 (1943)]. Like saying that

since the number of printing presses is limited, therefore, the King

will allocate newspaper publishing rights -- CLASSICAL GREMLIN

REASONING ON RATIONING. Based on this factual premise of frequency

scarcity, the radiant liberating qualities of the First Amendment was

held not to apply here; but actually the King, as usual, was lying in

his arguments to the Supreme Court in justification of this grab [but

a successful like requires two, the Supreme Court fell for it]. Down

to the present day, there has been nothing but a never ending organic

enlargement of the number of frequencies used since the inception of

radio transmission, because an organic technology has reduced

bandwidth frequencies through increasingly more sophisticated

transmission and reception hardware. The frequency bandwidth

technology claimed to have been limited in number has, as a factual

matter, simply grown to accommodate the demand. Not only are higher

frequencies now being used, but several channels are now scrambled

onto one frequency bandwidth with multiplexing and demultiplexing

taking place at the points of transmission and reception. Therefore,

with a regulatory jurisdiction nestled in place, the Federal

Communications Commission now has broad authority to determine the

right of access to broadcasting. See:

- FEDERAL RADIO COMMISSION VS. NELSON BROTHERS BOND AND MORTGAGE,

289 U.S. 266 (1933);

- FCC VS. POTTSVILLE, 309 U.S. 134 (1940);

- FCC VS. SANDERS BROTHERS RADIO STATION, 309 U.S. 470 (1940);

- FCC VS. ABC, 347 U.S. 284 (1954)].

In 1969, the Supreme Court, continuing on with this incorrect LIMITED

NUMBER OF FREQUENCIES line, said that while there is a protected right

of everyone to speak, write, or publish as he feels like, subject to

very few limitations, there is no comparable right of everyone to

broadcast due to limited frequencies [so we are told] -- see RED LION

BROADCASTING VS. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). Like Felix Frankfurter

would openly admit, judicial competence is quite limited; and just as

their COMMON SENSE deficiency manifests itself in many areas, such as

this FREQUENCY SHORTAGE line of reasoning, so too does their rare

gifted genius also surface in many areas. [678]end

And in other areas, technology has eaten away at what would have

otherwise been not permissible under the Fourth Amendment. [679]

[679] In 1927, coming out of a Prohibition enforcement action, the

United States Supreme Court ruled that wiretapping of telephone lines

by Government agents was not protected by the Fourth Amendment. The

technological development of the telephone in 1927 was then 50 years

old; and the Case portrays an ominous picture of what happens when our

Founding Fathers failed to bluntly, specifically, and explicitly tie

the King's giblets down tight, in no uncertain terms. Nowhere did our

Fathers require the application of the restrainment Principles found

in the Bill of Rights to be applied to technology then not existing,

even though in 1787 the printing press was a relatively recent

technological development. One might think that even in 1787,

something might come along not contemplated by the word "Press" in the

First Amendment -- but no, our Fathers did not provide for that.

Writing initially in WEEMS VS. UNITED STATES, dissenting Justice

Louis Brandeis had a few words to say about the inherently organic

nature of Constitutions:

"Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is

true, from an experience of evils, but its general language should

not, therefore, be necessarily confined to the form that evil had

theretofore taken. Time works changes, brings into existence new

conditions and purposes. Therefore, a principle to be vital must be

capable must be capable of wider application than the mischief which

gave it birth. This is particularly true of constitutions. They are

not ephemeral enactments [meaning short-lived or transient], designed

to meet passing occasions. They are, to use the words of Chief

Justice John Marshall, 'designed to approach immortality as nearly as

human institutions can approach it.' The future is their care and

provision for events of good and bad tendencies of which no prophecies

can be made. In the application of a constitution, therefore, our

contemplation cannot be only what has been, but of what may be. Under

any other rule indeed, a constitution would indeed be as easy of

application as it would be deficient in efficacy and power. Its

general principles would have little value and be converted by

precedent into lifeless and impotent formulas. Rights declared in

words might be lost in reality." - WEEMS VS. UNITED STATES, id., 217

U.S. 349, at 373 (1909).

In another case, Justice Brandeis then continued on in his own words:

"Discovery and invention have made it possible for the Government,

by means far more effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain

disclosure in court of what is whispered in the closet. ...The

progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of

espionage is not likely to stop with wiretapping. Ways may someday be

developed by which the Government, without removing papers from secret

drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled

to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home.

Advances in the psychic and related sciences may bring means of

exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts, and emotions." - Louis

Brandeis, OLMSTEAD VS. UNITED STATES, 277 U.S. 438, at 473 (1927).

[679]end

Today, in similar ways, the Fourth Amendment is being hacked apart in

ways our Fathers never even considered: Because the technology

existing today (aviation flights and electromagnetic scans) did not

exist then, so no such restrainments were included in their writing of

the Fourth Amendment. [680]

[680] "I foresee a second challenge to civil liberties in the next

century growing out of developments in science and technology. By

placing new tools at the Government's disposal, technological advances

enhance its power, and raise the question of when -- if ever -- the

Government may use these tools.

"In recent years, we have asked that question with regard to various

surveillance technologies, from X-Rays and magnetometers to wiretaps

to "bugs." I am told it is now possible to intercept conversations

through window panes with laser beams, and to eavesdrop on telephone

conversations by monitoring microwave radio channels. The uses of new

technologies are so hard to detect that even if the courts articulate

clear-cut rules, enforcing them will be unusually difficult. Yet, our

experience with surveillance technology teaches, if we are to preserve

the freedoms the Framers sought to guarantee, we must guard against

much more than the specific evils they feared.

"Although I cannot predict the technological developments of the next

century, I foresee intractable issues looming in behavior and thought

control. The emerging wizardries of chemotherapy, psychosurgery,

behavior modification and genetic engineering, with their "clockwork

orange" overtones, might seem an unlikely source of moral dilemmas.

...But like all technological advances, these developments carry

promise as well as peril." - Judge David Bazalon in CIVIL LIBERTIES --

PROTECTING OLD VALUES IN THE NEW CENTURY, 51 New York University Law

Review 505, at 511 (1976). [680]end

Rather than snickering at judges today, an accurate assessment of the

origin of the problem is that our Fathers lacked the sophistication

required to apply worst case scenarios over the likely geometry of

Government, and failed to pre-emptively apply their majestic

restrainments to apply to prospective, but then unknown, technological

innovations. [681]

[681] "Constitutions of Government are not to be framed upon a

calculation of existing exigencies; but upon a combination of these

with the probable exigencies of ages, according to the natural and

tried course of human affairs. There ought to be a capacity to

provide for future contingencies, as they may happen; and as these

are... illimitable in their nature, so it is impossible safely to

limit that capacity." - Joseph Story, II COMMENTARIES ON THE

CONSTITUTION, at 403 (Cambridge, 1833). [681]end

Yes, the Constitution was Inspired, but an Inspired Document is not a

perfect document; Inspiration only means supporting ASSISTANCE, and

not CONTROL.

But... remember that the question of damages or no damages is a Tort

Law factual setting question and it not relevant when you are out on

those state highways: Because a contract is in effect whenever you use

those highways, by your acceptance of benefits offered for your use

conditionally. When you operate a motor vehicle over those state

highways, you have accepted special benefits created and offered by

the state, and so when accepting juristic benefits, in the context of

reciprocity being expected back in return, then there lies a contract

-- quietly, invisible, automatic, and rather strong. The relational

non-Commercial, non-Resident, and non-Citizen status of the operator

off of the highway is irrelevant in attaching contract liability by

accepting the use of the benefit of Government highways. A specific,

on-point adjudication on this Driver's License Question is going to

involve this question:

Whether the States have the standing jurisdiction required to

force, under penal statutes, a regulatory jurisdiction such a contract

creates, when tension is in effect between the existence of that

contract, and the substantive RIGHT TO TRAVEL interests discussed in

appellate rulings.

In every recent state court ruling that I have examined (post 1930

era) where a QUO WARRANTO type of question was being addressed, [682]

[682] QUO WARRANTO asks the question: By what Jurisdiction? [682]end

all courts forced a regulatory jurisdiction over the operator of a

motor vehicle, and pleas and cries for restrainments based on RIGHT TO

TRAVEL and RIGHT TO WORK tensions and the like, have all universally

fallen on deaf ears with state judges in this era, and also by Federal

Judges when addressing questions of Civil Rights violations relief

when Highway Contract Protesters throw vindictive Section 1983 actions

at some traffic cop.

Yet despite this predominate skew towards contract priority in

judicial RIGHT TO TRAVEL doctrinal reasoning, annulment by the Supreme

Court of criminal liability for the innocent use of public highways

under circumstances where no collaborating damages were caused, would

be appropriate; an honest assessment of the total factual picture by a

sophisticated judge would result in the conclusion that merely driving

a car down a street without a license does not ascend to the minimum

threshold requirements that characterize legitimate criminal

incarceration standards -- compelled contract or no compelled

contract; those penal highway statutes exist by virtue of Special

Interest Group sponsorship and pressure, and judges are diminishing

their own stature and violate the restraining mandates inherent in the

REPUBLICAN FORM OF GOVERNMENT CLAUSE, by letting clever and

politically ambitious Special Interest Groups get away with whatever

they can buy in Legislatures to damage innocent behavior under

circumstances where unnecessary covenants within adhesive contracts

are being asserted in tension with Substantive Natural Rights in the

Locomotion area; other highway drivers have no assurance that another

approaching car is not being driven by an unlicensed Citizen of

France, who by virtue of his political status would not have an

unlicensed motor vehicle operation penal statute thrown at him.

Therefore, there is an inherent ASSUMPTION OF RISK among all highway

users that some drivers will necessarily have to be unlicensed, [683]

[683] In Highway Tort Liability Law, the phrase I quoted earlier,

called ASSUMPTION OF RISK, is actually a legal doctrine; it is a

negligence defense argument to throw at adversaries in the heat of

judicial battle. In a highway Tort Law liability setting, this

Doctrine would surface where a guest who accepts a gratuitous ride in

your car is deemed to have assumed the risk of any defects that exist

in your car that were unknown to you. This Doctrine is related to a

PRINCIPLE OF NATURE that mandates that there has to come some point in

time, regardless of any other mitigating element present in the

factual setting, that requires to pull that thumb of theirs out of

their mouths and start taking some responsibility for the uncontrolled

knocks and circumstantial aberrations that make their infrequent

appearance in our lives down here, as they knowingly entered into risk

environment situations [like driving on highways] where they knew

something adverse could happen, and yet, they went right ahead and

took the ride any way. [See generally, William Prosser, LAW OF TORTS

["Negligence: Defenses"] (West Publishing, 1971) 4th Edition.]

[683]end

since it is literally legally impossible, and also unattractive for

Foreign Relations reasons not related to preventing vehicular

accidents, to maintain a perfect expectation of motorist licensing

compliance. [684]

[684] This is just another example of Government's MODUS OPERANDI: If

they can grab the tax and get away with it politically, they will --

while remaining silent on the exceptions. If Government can force a

licensing environment over you, they will and if they cannot, they

will not; and then they will remain silent on their legal and

practical disabilities. Criminals too operate in similar ways:

Imagine yourself being at a ski resort; there are 60 pairs of skis and

poles leaning against a rack; and along comes a criminal casing the

place over. Fifty pairs of the skis are locked down, and 10 of them

are not. If you were a criminal, what would you do? Criminals take

what they can take, and leave behind that which is relatively too

difficult to grab and make off with.

"The only object we have here in view in presenting this

[graduated income tax] amendment is to rake in where there is

something to rake in, not to throw out the dragnet where there is

nothing to catch." - Senator William Peffer, June 21, 1894 [as quoted

by Frank Chodorov in THE INCOME TAX, page 37 (Devin-Adair, 1954)].

[684]end

These risk elements on using highways are judgment factors that all

motorists evaluate and consider, even though this process is often

invisible by operating in the psychological strata of the

subconscious; the actual judgment process involved when a composite

profile confluence of such risk elements are blended together and

evaluated, is called RISK ASSESSMENT. [685]

[685] Everyone is in a constant state of making RISK ASSESSMENTS, even

though not all folks scientifically view their judgment thinking along

these well defined lines; anytime an environment of risk is being

entered, RISK ASSESSMENT judgment is actually being made, even if

subconsciously. Gremlins, being the administratively well organized

body of vermin workhorses that they are, also thoroughly immerse

themselves in precise, well thought out RISK ASSESSMENT model

scenarios. This process is normally used in such areas like probing

for the probable subject reaction to one more turn of the screws, or

in estimating the likelihood of actually achieving, and then getting

away with, some desired damages somewhere -- some murder, some

revolution, or some war, conquest, asset grab, or famine being

manufactured someplace. From the Gremlin perspective, then, RISK

ASSESSMENT has to be viewed as another tool in the decision making

process to deflect the occurrence of adverse circumstances as what was

once a great Gremlin en screwment plan starts to fall apart for some

unexpected reason. Gremlins have had a few words to say about

structural risk analysis and assessment (I selected this discourse due

to its Highway setting and the political overtones it brings to

light):

"There is no such thing as a risk free society. There is no point

in getting into a panic about the risks of life until you have [made

comparisons]. ...puzzling is the apparently irrational attitude which

people have towards environmental hazards... Some 7,000 people are

killed and some 350,000 injured each year on the roads of Britain.

Yet this perpetual carnage -- nearly 1,000 killed or injured every day

-- generates no public outrage. ...you will find that politicians

will be rather chary of imposing a maximum speed limit of 50 miles per

hour on all roads where the limit is not already 30 or 40, though if

they did, both energy and lives would be saved. Why then don't the do

it? It would not REALLY be difficult to enforce.

"...I shall put the answer politely: Their [RISK ASSESSMENT]

judgment... tells them that people would not like it. And then all

the other goodies they have in mind for you, less unemployment, less

inflation, less taxation, and increasing standard of living, fair

shares for all... you name it -- might be unrealizable; because, you

might say, 'Maybe we need a change of Government. I want to go faster

than 50 miles per hour on all those marvelous motorways I paid for.'

"...The results of risk accounting are surprising..." -Baron

Nathaniel Rothschild in the WALL STREET JOURNAL ["Coming to Grips with

Risk"], page 22 (March 13, 1979).

Just as RISK ASSESSMENT is applied to the decision making process by

Gremlins through benefit and detriment comparison, we too will now

decide whether or not we will enter into replacement Covenants again

with Father down here; RISK ASSESSMENT weighs the costs involved and

compares them with the benefits earned. In your own RISK ASSESSMENT

judgment process, while looking back at your own life for the past 10

years, we need to ask ourselves a QUESTION:

Would I really have been inconvenienced to have spent Sunday

mornings in Church instead of on the golf course, and also spent a few

other hours across the weekdays on Celestial Contract related work?

For the value placed on the inconvenience involved, is the risk of

standing before Father at the Last Day, without having been tried

under his NEW AND EVERLASTING COVENANTS, worth the probable forfeiture

of Celestial benefits? The answer to that Question lies within

yourself. [685]end

In a factual setting where an unlicensed driver creates damages out on

the highway, then punitive incarceration is appropriate, and this

requirement reconciles everyone's objections by accomplishing the same

identical criminal recourse the INCARCERATIONISTS yearn for so much in

their vindictive cries for encagement glory.

Incidentally, by comparison in Canada, the Ontario Police only seeks a

$53 civil fine for driving without a license, and the sky doesn't seem

to be falling in on Canada without the existence of some precious

little penal statute in existence to incarcerate an unlicensed drive;

so Case hardened American judges who parrot the Insurance Company

lobbyist line (that incarceration is the only medicine to deal with

unlicensed drivers) are exercising flaky judgment that isn't very well

thought out ("...da law says I gotta"). [686]

[686] For a review of the numerous arguments on judicial competence

limitations and calibre capacity as manifested by Case hardened

Judges, see THINKING ABOUT COURTS: TOWARDS AND BEYOND A JURISPRUDENCE

OF JUDICIAL COMPETENCY by Ralph Cavanaugh, et al., in 14 Law and

Society Review 371 (1980). [686]end

Even prominent United States Supreme Court Judges can be found

operating in this competency limitation strata, [687]

[687] Justice Felix Frankfurter very openly stated his observation

that judicial competence is limited. In MARCONI WIRELESS VS. UNITED

STATES, he stated that:

"It is an observation that the training of Anglo-American judges

ill fits them to discharge the duties cast upon them by patent

legislation. ...judges must overcome their scientific incompetence as

best they can." - MARCONI WIRELESS VS. UNITED STATES, 320 U.S. 1, at

60 (1942).

Justice Frankfurter then went on with supporting quotations from

Thomas Jefferson and Judge Learned Hand. And just as Federal Judges

can be competency deficient in scientific knowledge, thus rendering

their judgments in that area prone to error, so too can they be, and

in fact are, competency deficient in other areas as well, generating

similar erroneous judgment results. [687]end

as they live in a shell, isolated away from divergent opinions that

may very well be built upon an enlarged basis of factual knowledge

they do not possess, and as such, just might possibly have some merit

to them. [688]

[688]

Consider Supreme Court Justice William Rehnquist:

"No one questions that the State may require the licensing of

those who drive on its highways and the registration of vehicles which

are driven on those highways." - Rehnquist, dissenting, in DELAWARE

VS. PROUSE, 440 U.S. 648, at 665 (1978).

Sorry, Mr. Rehnquist, but there are many people who are questioning

such a licensing requirement, and they have more than sufficient

minimum legal authority, based on several THOUSAND State and Federal

Court Opinions from a different era, as to warrant both a hearing and

an extended Judicial response -- and not the snortations of a Judge

who spent virtually his entire isolated life working for Government.

[Notice how I said that Highway Contract Protesters are entitled to a

Hearing and an Explanation. I did not say that they are entitled to

prevail.] [688]end

This highway power play by Insurance Companies, to use penal statutes

and the police powers to experience Commercial self-enrichment, raises

a secondary "fairness" question on the propriety of using statutes

operationally skewed to favor their sponsors; however, "fairness" is a

Tort concept definable only along the infinite -- and in contrast to

that, contracts are narrow, specific, and contain detailed positive

mandates and negative restrainments in effect between the parties.

Being that contracts are both specific and finite, and that special

benefits were accepted synchronous with the contract's technical

reciprocal contours being pre-defined; therefore, the inherently

indeterminate nature of FAIRNESS is fundamentally out of harmony with

contracts, and properly belongs in that free-wheeling world of Tort

Law, where anything goes. Where the terms of contracts are not freely

negotiated due to the dominate overbearing positional strength of one

of the parties, the judicial allowance of a DE MINIMIS amount of

corrective "fairness" is appropriate since there never was any mutual

assent [689]

[689] For an illuminating article on the topic of MUTUAL ASSENT in

contracts, see Samuel Williston in MUTUAL ASSENT IN THE FORMATION OF

CONTRACTS, 14 Illinois Law Review 85. Under some conditions, the

amount and nature of relief damages that can be awarded under

contracts is sensitive to the status of the contracts falling under an

OBJECTIVE meeting of the minds test [meaning some type of an Adhesion

or quasi-contract (forced in whole or part on people) is in effect];

or in the alternative, a SUBJECTIVE meeting of the minds [meaning a

purely negotiated contract is in effect]. See IMPLIED-IN-FACT

CONTRACTS AND MUTUAL ASSENT by George P. Costigan, 33 Harvard Law

Review 376 (1919). [689]end

-- and that already exists in American Jurisprudence and is now called

the Adhesion Contract Doctrine. [690]

[690] In 1985, the California Supreme Court handed down four cases

that I am aware of that touched to some extent on the ADHESION

CONTRACT DOCTRINE:

- VICTORIA VS. SUPERIOR COURT, 710 Pacific 2nd 833 (1985);

- PERDUE VS. CROCKER NATIONAL BANK, 702 Pacific 2nd 503 (1985);

- E.S. BILLS INS. VS. TZUCANOW, 700 Pacific 2nd 1280 (1985);

- SEARLE VS. ALLSTATE LIFE INSURANCE, 696 Pacific 2nd 1308 (1985).

For example, in PERDUE VS. CROCKER NATIONAL BANK, bank account

signature cards were deemed Adhesion Contracts; and Contracts of

Adhesion are referred to as signifying standardized contracts which,

when drafted and imposed by a party of superior bargaining strength,

relegates to the other subscribing party only the opportunity to

adhere to the contract, or in the alternative, to reject it IN TOTO

[meaning rejected IN THE WHOLE]. In SEARLE VS. ALLSTATE LIFE

INSURANCE, Justice Bird noted that insurance policies are Contracts of

Adhesion, and that therefore, if there are any vague, evasive, and

ambiguous statements in the contract, the party who drafted the

contract (the insurance company) loses when a grievance turning on the

vague clause comes before a Court. In both Cases, an underlying

common denominator surfaces in that there really was not any MUTUAL

ASSENT ("meeting of the minds") in effect by the parties at the time

the contract was entered into. [690]end

But to otherwise allow a party to bring in claims of "fairness" from

the outside, to now operate on the contract, would be to work a Tort

on the other party that such "fairness" operates against. This is an

important concept to understand with contracts. As a PRINCIPLE OF

NATURE, Judges are correct when they toss out your arguments that

sound in the pleasing tone of Tort, when you are a party to a Contract

Law jurisprudential grievance. WILLFUL FAILURE TO FILE and Highway

Traffic Infractions are all Contract Law grievances. Remember that

invisible contracts are in effect whenever benefits have been accepted

and reciprocity is being expected back in return. Your use of the

state's highways automatically creates the existence of such an

invisible juristic contract, and also attaches the summary features of

a giblet cracking regulatory adjudicating Star Chamber that American

Traffic Courts have infamous reputations for. [691]

[691] Occasionally, I have heard rumblings from Highway Contract

Protesters to the effect that both the United States and the several

States lack jurisdiction to exclude foot passengers from using the

Interstate Highway System. They cite the Common Law Doctrine that:

"...all persons have a right to walk on a public highway, and are

entitled to the exercise of reasonable care on the part of persons

driving carriages along it." - Joseph Angell in LAW OF HIGHWAYS, at

454 [Little Brown (1886)]. [Joseph Angell also cites BROOKS VS.

SCHWERIN, 54 New York 343 to state that foot passengers have equal

rights with those driving in carriages.]

The answer lies in another Common Law Doctrine that gave improved

methods of locomotion SUPERIOR PRIVILEGES on highway use. See a Case

entitled MACOMBER VS. NICHOLS, 34 Michigan 212 (1875), for an Opinion

by Chief Judge Cooley discussing this Doctrine, and the interesting

Case citations therein. See also ROAD RIGHTS AND LIABILITY OF

WHEELMEN by George Clemenston [Callaghan & Company, Chicago (1895)].

Sorry, Protesters, but our Father's Common Law is not being damaged by

the placement of signs at entrances to Interstate Highways that

exclude foot passengers; such PUBLIC NOTICE reasonably creates

expectations of reciprocity by the highway's owners that they are

conditionally offering the use of that highway to you as a benefit,

and so now contracts are in effect. Those Interstate Highways are

special purpose limited use highways constructed along sealed

corridors where any type of use limitation is purely discretionary by

their Government owners. Government is not required to build those

Interstate Highway s for you, so when they do so, they are built and

offered for use on their terms. [691]end

Yet, there is some minimal merit present in the Patriot position out

on the highways. Patriots have been silent on a judicial

enlightenment analogy that should be made here, as some Patriots like

to enlighten Judges on reasoning and Principles applicable to favorite

Patriot factual setting confrontations. The Supreme Court has ruled

that shopping center owners, who open up their premises for public

ingress and egress, lose some of their property rights, i.e., there is

a declension in status from having absolute authority to eject with

discretion anyone they want, down to being restrained from doing so.

[692]

[692]

- MARSH VS. ALABAMA, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); [A company owned town

had taken on a PUBLIC FUNCTION and could not prohibit the distribution

of religious material on the town's privately owned streets.]

- AMALGAMATED FOOD EMPLOYEES VS. LOGAN VALLEY PIZZA, 391 U.S.

308 (1968); [Shopping center management cannot interfere with union

pickets, reasoning that shopping centers were the functional

equivalent of central business districts. (LOGAN VALLEY was later

modified in LLOYD CORPORATION VS. TANNER, 407 U.S. 551 (1972)].

- PRUNEYARD SHOPPING CENTER VS. ROBINS, 447 U.S. 74 (1980);

[Shopping center management restrained from ejecting persons (high

school students) disseminating political literature (a petition in

opposition to the United Nations Resolution against Zionism).

Affirmed on the basis of adequate and independent California state

grounds; property owners face diminished expectations of property

rights when their property is open to the public.] [692]end

If this legal reasoning, which diminishes the rights of property

owners, were to be applied to a highway setting by way of comparative

analogy, then the fact that Government Highways are open to the public

should, theoretically, partially restrain the State from exercising

absolute jurisdiction to eject a person from merely using the highways

without a license, down to a reduced property rights status where the

mere non-existence of a compelled Driver's License is insufficient

grounds for incarceration, absent, perhaps, collaborating causal

damages. Of and by itself, that argument won't win any Cases (the

quiescent environmental ambiance one enjoys walking down a row of

store fronts in a shopping center really does not have any factual

parity with the high-powered accelerated velocity of contemporary

highways). I know that Protesters would very much like to hear me

throw invectives at Traffic Court Star Chamber Magistrates and state

that PRINCIPLES OF NATURE are being violated by Judges by their

consenting to incarcerate unlicensed drivers at Sentencing Hearings,

[693]

[693] "...DA LAW SAYS I GOTTA" -- as their eyes are fixated on penal

statutes; their minds swirling in accident statistics colored by

Insurance Companies; and with a pair of demons at their sides, working

them over and hacking away at them by reminding the judge just how

tough of a cookie he really is to deal with such naked defiance by a

Protester. [693]end

but Traffic Courts are merely enforcing contracts, and no restrainment

exists in appellate court rulings or other pronouncing instruments of

Law; nowhere is there specific wording to disable expectations of

reciprocity denominated in penal terms, on those Highway Contracts.

As for the analogy in status declension, this property rights

declension in status experienced by property owners who open up their

property for public use is just the same old longstanding Common Law

restrainment that English judges placed on the King of England updated

and applied to a contemporary Commercial factual setting of privately

owned shopping centers, that restrained the King from selectively

excluding persons from using the King's Highways by requiring free and

open access and use of the King's Highways to everyone. [694]

[694] And in real property law, a variation of this Principle surfaces

in the INGRESS AND EGRESS DOCTRINE, which forces the neighbors of a

landlocked parcel of land to yield some of their property rights and

grant a right of way easement to the nearest public thoroughfare for

the benefit of the fellow who is landlocked. [694]end

The application of this Principle also surfaces again with the rights

of property owners adjoining public highways, to yield their

expectations of exclusion and privacy whenever the highway itself

becomes impassable or otherwise founderous, and allows travelers to

leave the highway and start using your property. [695]

[695] "If the usual track is impassable, it is for the general good

that people should be entitled to pass another line." - Lord

Mansfield, in COMYN'S DIGEST, "Chemin," D.6. [695]end

Called the RIGHT TO TRAVEL EXTRA VIAM, this yield in property rights

is deemed to be only of a temporary character, and people acquiring

the property which adjoins the Highway already had their prior NOTICE

that the day might come when inclement weather may cause some

travelers to use a few feet of your property. The Principle which

supports its use is not unlike that Principle which undergrids the

DOCTRINE OF PRIVATE WAYS BY NECESSITY. [696]

[696] See a chapter called "Founderous Roads -- Right to Travel EXTRA

VIAM" in the book entitled "THE LAW OF ROADS AND STREETS by Byron

Elliott [Brown-Merrill (1890)]. [696]end

Remember that in another setting the King also experiences a

declension in Status whenever he enters into the world of Commerce:

From Sovereign to just another corporation game player. In any event,

Highway Contract Protesters remaining unconvinced of their weak

position need further development on the true origin of the Patriot

problem out on those highways: A contract, and the elevated priority

in Nature that contracts ascend to whenever they are in effect. If

the significance of that idea is not being learned now, then I can

assure you that you will learn it in no uncertain terms at the Last

Day.

And as for you lingering diehard Protesters, your BILLS OF ATTAINDER

arguments based on restrainments in the United States Constitution

will not vitiate your Highway Contract liability. BILLS OF ATTAINDER

are legislative acts that inflict punishment without a judicial trial,

and violate the Separation of Powers Doctrine. [697]

[697] CUMMINGS VS. MISSOURI, 4 U.S. 323 (1866); [Clergymen were

barred from the ministry in the absence of subscribing to a loyalty

oath.] [697]end

Thinking about the Patriot argument in a light most favorable to the

Protester, in a sense, traffic tickets issued out by policing agencies

operating under the Executive Branch, pre-adjudicating guilt and

demanding fines, appear to function quite clearly as BILLS OF

ATTAINDER. [698]

[698] See generally, LEGISLATURE DISQUALIFICATION AS BILLS OF

ATTAINDER, by Wormuth, 4 Vanderbuilt Law Review 603 (1951). [698]end

Invisible contracts are in effect whenever you accept benefits

conditionally offered by someone else; but the existence of a contract

in the highway factual setting presented the Judiciary in protesting

an assertion of regulatory jurisdiction is not relevant with this

particular argument some Highway Protesters are using incorrectly.

BILLS OF ATTAINDER originated in Old England, as the English

Parliament sentenced individuals and identifiable members of a group

to death. [699]

[699] See, for example, the 1685 attainder of James, Duke of Monmouth,

for High Treason:

"WHEREAS James Duke of Monmouth has in an hostile manner invaded

this kingdom, and is now in open rebellion, levying war against the

king, contrary to the duty of his allegiance; Be it enacted by the

King's most excellent majesty, by and with the advice and consent of

the lords spiritual and temporal, and commons in this parliament

assembled, and the authority of the same, That the said James Duke of

Monmouth stand and be convicted and attained for high treason, and

that he suffer pain of death, and incur all forfeitures as a traitor

convicted and attained of high treason." - 1 JACOB 2, c.2 (1685)

The forfeiture the statute is referring to is the total grab of the

condemned person's property by the King, and the corruption of his

blood (whereby his heirs were denied the right to inherit his estate).

[699]end

Correlative to the BILLS OF ATTAINDER Protester argument is the BILLS