The Story of Banking

Although this chapter is entitled “The Story of Banking”, the title appears to refer to the material covered in the preceding chapter. I have broken this chapter out into the following general subjects: Non-Public Law (Ignorance Is No Excuse); Public Notices and Presumptions; Right to Travel; Income Tax Protests; and Implicit Contracts.

There is an initial reference to bank accounts, those “profound legal devices of conclusive evidence that attach King’s Equity Jurisdiction”, and a very important point is made in a footnote: Prima facie evidence of criminal liability for penal statutes arises from the fact that a personal bank account puts one in the realm of Interstate Commerce due to the Interstate nature of banking.

Non-Public Law (Ignorance Is No Excuse?)

With regard to the frequent abuse of constitutional arguments “sounding in tort” in the contractual setting of administrative courts, Mercier avers:

“The leit motif of the United States Constitution, and of its operating appendage, the Bill of Rights, and of the underlying Articles of Confederation (which are still in effect), and of other related organic documents, is the restrainment of Government from functioning as a Tortfeasor; and these documents were never, ever, designed or intended to negotiate terms of contracts.”

How very unfortunate, then, that today’s Admiralty courts deal almost exclusively in “equity” contracts to which the Constitution simply does not apply.  The REASON that today’s courts are so equity-oriented appears to be that all corporate members (citizens as defined by the Fourteenth Amendment) are, factually, the chattels pledged to the IBC as collateral in the bankruptcy of the UNITED STATES back in the 1930s.

Citing the Dred Scott v. Sandford case, a footnote comments:

“Although… [the Constitution is very clear and precise], Clauses governing Commercial contracts are excluded from its language, and hence, the Commercial Contract is excluded from the reach of its restraining Congressional mandates; with the result being that Commercial Contracts operate on their strata free from Constitutional supervision, and the Constitution cannot be used as a tool by either party to try and overrule, out maneuver, or otherwise weasel out of a Commercial Contract.”

Another noteworthy footnote spells out why statutory laws are not really part of the Common Law—which can really only be modified by judicial decision—and why much of the law simply does not exist either in the statutes or judicial decisions rendered.

[QUOTING from a footnote:]

“Much of our law is not expressed in statutory form. Important parts of almost all subjects, and all, or nearly all, of the law on many subjects is expressed with binding authority only in the recorded decisions of the courts. When a case is presented to a court for a decision, prior decisions in cases involving more or less similar questions are precedents from which rules for the guidance of the court may possibly be derived. A rule thus repeatedly recognized through its frequent application by the courts becomes a principle of the common law. The greater the number, variety and importance of the transactions to which a principle applies, the more fundamental the principle. The decisions of the courts as a source of law are not confined to subjects on which no legislative provision exists. It is true that a statute may so minutely describe all the situations to which it applies that the courts have no other duty in connection with its application than to ascertain the facts of the case alleged to come under its provisions.  The great bulk of our statutory law, however, is not of this character. Practically all statutes relating to substantive law contain one or more provisions sufficiently general to raise a doubt as to their proper application in some cases. Such a doubt can be resolved only by the decision of the courts….

“…The principles of the common law are developed by the slow process of judicial decision. The power that makes may modify and hence the common law has a flexibility which the statute law does not possess. A court may consider all facts of a case with a view to recognizing in any one or more of them a just cause for an exception to a previously recognized principle. Some uncertainty in the ramifications of the common law is therefore inevitable. It would exist although there was general agreement on clearly expressed fundamental principles, but the possible uncertainty is increased because unfortunately no such general agreement exists. It is not the duty of our courts to set forth the principles of the common law in an orderly manner, or even to express or explain them, except in connection with the application of one or more of them to the decision of a particular case. To obtain even an approximation to such an agreement on fundamental principles these would have to be set forth by public authority or by an agency commanding the respect and attention of the courts. There is no such agency, and this lack of general agreement on fundamental principles is the most important cause of uncertainty in the law.”—Report of the Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent Organization for Improvement of the Law Proposing the Establishment of an American Law Institute, at 66, dated February 23, 1923 in Washington, D.C. (American Law Institute Library, Philadelphia).

[END QUOTING]

The very large body of public law is, by and large, available to the public and much of that can be accessed by anyone with an Internet connection.  Somewhat surprisingly, however, if you studied the hundreds of thousands of pages of public law and judicial opinions most thoroughly, you would only have a portion of the total law. How, then, can it be said that “ignorance of the law is no excuse”? What of that part of the law to which there is no public access whatsoever? What comprises this large corpus of INVISIBLE LAW? And how can the maxim that “Ignorance is no excuse” possibly apply to such law? Mercier explains (from a federal judge’s perspective):

[QUOTING:]

“Additionally, there is a deeper correlative line to this question of vitiating excuse by ignorance. There are statutory laws, and there are judicial opinions, and they should be known. However, in this direction, there is a rather large body of law out there, in full force and effect in the practical setting, a body of law that has never been written down in any public place. This law carries the same and sometimes greater amount of operational weight as statutes themselves. This corpus of law has its seminal point of origin in a multiplicity of different places, such as:

“1. A phone call from Chief Justice Warren Burger (‘I don’t want this thing up here’);

“2. The policy pronouncements that State and Federal Judges generate for themselves in the quiet conclave of their Judicial Conferences;

“3. The quietly circulated judicial Memorandums from the Supreme Court and State Supreme Courts (‘...things will be done this way on these types from now on’) that circulate down to lower appellate forums and district trial courts;

“4. The informal rap sessions and lectures sponsored for Federal Magistrates by the Aspen Institute at their Wye Plantation;

“5. And on and on.”

So now that state of affairs, that confluence of non-legislative laws intellectually influencing the Judiciary, raises the inverse question of basic fairness of applying those largely unknown, highly detailed and quite intricate laws that are out there floating around, to people like Armen Condo who do not know any of them, and could not be expected to reasonably know of them since steps are taken to limit their exposure.

To the extent that Armen Condo is being held liable for terms of contracts he did not even bother to read, there can be no excuse by ignorance claimed….

…To the extent that someone is held liable to the terms of laws deliberately hidden from his knowledge, ignorance is then excusable in this setting.

So all factors considered, the bottom line on this ignorance line is this: People have to start taking some responsibility for their own affairs, and stop expressing somewhat passionate opinions that are in want of accuracy, and which expressions of discontent always try to shift responsibility for the act or non-act onto some other third party; in the case of Armen Condo, he came down on the King’s Tax Collectors, the King’s Attorneys, and the Federal Magistrate.

The fact that Mr. Condo did not know of his contracts is an interesting question; a question I would very much like to come to grips with if I were a Magistrate. When a Person starts signing contracts, indifferent to the content and with an element of mild recklessness involved (“...it’s just a checking account”), which contracts then refer to other binding contracts, and then a Defendant claims innocence through ignorance as an excuse to weasel out of his commitments, then there has to come a point in time when such a Person should pull his thumb out of his mouth and start to take some responsibility for the total content of the contracts he signs. When such claims of ignorance are interstitially placed in the defensive prosecution factual setting of someone who is totally and thoroughly convinced that they are absolutely correct (men like Armen Condo and Irwin Schiff), then there will come a point in time when mistakes have to be eaten, diapers have to drop, the reckless crudities of an earlier age are reversed, and the defective judgments exercised in a previous era (the decision to avoid learning the total content of one’s contracts), collectively as a habit, are terminated, for good.

The only thing that would irritate me as a Judge would be the continuing refusal of such people before my Bar to see their error, given an explanation of why they erred [and since when is such an explanation ever given?], with the refusal to see their error due to their own intellectual shell they live in, and their intellectual prejudice against the King. For example, in one Such Willful Failure to File 7203 prosecution I examined in California, the Tax Protestor went through all the classic Constitutional Tax Protesting arguments in pre-Trial hearings. When the Federal Judge made the statement that: “...I think you are being used as a pawn by others to your own detriment,” the Tax Protestor snickered back his resentment at the Star Chamber treatment he was being given.  But if given a few moment’s thought, such a statement by a Judge is quite significant: because it means that the Judge has a considerable basis of factual knowledge on Tax Protestors, their arguments, the foolishness of their position in a Contract Law grievance, and the fact that the Tax Protestor is up against significant damages by likely protracted incarceration, and that the Judge might be sympathetic to repentance. In contrast, if a Judge ever blurted out those words to me as a Defendant, I would be on his case forever to find answers to the big question the Tax Protestor missed: Why, by whom, and how? And that difference in handling Judicial Rebuffment emulates the true seminal point of error that explains why Tax Protestors like Armen Condo mess up: They are not in a teachable state of mind, and they are their own worst enemy. If a Federal Judge told me that line in a prosecution I was going through, after having found out my error (that I was up to my neck in contracts with the King, and that my defiance was unethical and improvident), I would immediately capitulate, admit my error, sign it, file it, pay it, eat it.  But the next time around, after having learned my error on that point, the IRS would have a different slice of meat to deal with.

[END QUOTING]

Public Notices and Presumptions

It is worth noting that a Public Notice invoking Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, while neither invisible nor unwritten, is also part of the by-and-large INVISIBLE body of law to which Mercier refers. Rule 301 (“…a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption”) is invoked to establish a presumption for any controversy—and it can be a most effective tool to subtly shift the balance of a controversy.  “Funny” how attorners never let on that this tool is available to the common man.  This subject is covered primarily in a footnote to this chapter.

[QUOTING:]

What the King is taking advantage of here are some fellows called Presumptions.  These little creatures are known to make quick appearances at Trials—when they surface, go to work in someone’s favor on some evidentiary question, and then disappear back into the woodwork again from which they came. Presumptions are not evidence itself, but these invisible fellows function in a Courtroom in ways similar to directors and Stage Lights in a drama theater production; by directing some of the sets and actors to turn this way or that, and by throwing different colored lights on objects on the Stage.  Presumptions change the appearance of the evidence Show that is being presented… and as a result of the different Lighting angles and color hue techniques, the [court] is led to make certain Inferences and presumptions regarding the evidence Show… :

“Presumptions are deductions or conclusions which the law requires the jury to make under certain circumstances, in the absence of evidence in the case which leads the jury to a different or contrary conclusion.  A presumption continues to exist only so long as it is not overcome or outweighed by evidence in the case to the contrary; but unless and until so outweighed, the jury should find in accordance with the presumption.”—E. Devitt et al., in Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Section 71.04 (2^nd Edition, 1970).

As it pertains to Government Public Notice statutes, one of These Presumption fellows is waiting in the wings, called a Notice Presumption.  This fellow is waiting for that day when some statute will be thrown at you in a prosecution. When that great day happens, this invisible fellow will suddenly make his appearance in your prosecution, coloring the evidence adjudged in a light unfavorable to any Lack of Knowledge on Contract Terms claims you raise at that time; and then having done his work, he will go back into the woodwork and disappear.

[You might assume that the courts operate according to the presumption of “innocent until proven guilty”, for instance, but that would be an incorrect presumption for a number of reasons: invisible contracts that govern the matter, for sure, but also the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917 have resulted in a reversal of this fundamental presumption.  “Crimes”—such as those admitted to by our friend the health-products distributor mentioned earlier in the overall synopsis—are “commercial crimes” only, since no harm was done thereby and the same acts at Common Law are simply NOT criminal.  But you end up in a position highly pressured by the prosecution, where you feel you must have an attorney and that outrageous pressurization occurs because, as Mercier writes: “Criminal Magistrates want very much for you to have Counsel, as the mere lack of Counsel bars them incarcerating accused Persons.”]

There is an extensive body of Evidentiary Law on Presumptions and Inferences written down waiting for your intellectual absorption; as a point of beginning, to become acquainted with the modus operandi of these slick and invisible hardworking presumption fellows, consider:

• Wigmore on Evidence (”Presumptions”) (1981) (a huge 9 volume set);
• J. Thayer in Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at Common Law (1898); (Wigmore and Thayer are extensively quoted by state and Federal judges in all American jurisdictions; when the Congress drafted their new Federal Rules of Evidence in 1974, the opinions of Wigmore and Thayer were predominate in quotations cited by commentators. See the 93^rd Congress, 2^nd Session, HR 5463 (House) and Serial #2 (Senate));
• C. McCormick in Handbook on Evidence (1954 Edition);
• McBaine in Presumptions: Are They Evidence? 26 California Law Review 519 (1938);
• David Louisell in Construing Rule 301: Instructing the Jury..., 63 Virginia Law Review 28 (1977);
• Morgan and Maguire in Looking Backwards and Forwards at Evidence, 50 Harvard Law Review 909 (1937);
• 34 L Ed 2^nd (“Presumptions”);
• Morgan in Instructing the Jury on Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47 Harvard Law Review 59 (1933).

The Second Coming of the Savior spells the end of this world for Gremlins (as this is their world, in a sense); and like Gremlins, these invisible presumption fellows will be raised and brought forth to make their appearance at the Last Judgment Day with Father; but unlike Gremlins, these presumption fellows won’t need to concern themselves with a double cross by Lucifer: Because presumptions are not up for judgment. Generally, the interposition by the invisible presumption fellows into our Celestial Contracts are sophisticated concepts and require a presentation setting in a protracted background discussion, which is something that lends itself well to another future Letter. However, for an introductory glimpse into the world of presumptions and of their origins in the Heavens, see Francis Coffrin vs. United States (156 U.S. 432 (1894)); there the Supreme Court suggested the possibility that the Presumption of innocence in a criminal Trial can be found in Deuteronomy (Coffrin, id., at 454). When you get through with my impending discourse on presumptions, you will see that these invisible presumption fellows have been around a lot longer than just the BC days of Moses when he wrote Deuteronomy—as their origin is long before the Garden of Eden was created, back before this World was created, back a long time ago, on a planet far away, when our Heavenly Father, as a man then, went through his Second Estate just like you and I are going through our Second Estate now. Through contemporary Prophets, it has been revealed to us what some of the circumstances were that Father when through back then... As for us now, just what presumption fellows will be making their appearance in our favor or against us at the Last Day depends upon the factual setting we create down here; factors taken into consideration are whether or not First Estate replacement Covenants were entered into, and which of those Covenants were then honored in whole or in part; and what was the extent to which we listened to Lucifer’s Sub silentio imps hacking away at us—that “...You just don’t need to concern yourself with any of that contract jazz. That Mercier—baah!”  Provident to understand for the moment is that when we are under the Covenant, numerous presumptions will be both making an appearance on our behalf and operating in our favor, at the Last Day.

[END QUOTING]

Right to Travel?

By far the greatest volume of words spent on any one subject in this chapter is directed at what must have been a very powerful emotional experience for George Mercier, as he attempted to confront the King on the issue of his Right to Travel.

Obviously, a man is not free if he is not free to “move about the country” and the Right to Travel has been recognized by the Supreme Court as a fundamental right of freedom. That being (or appearing to be) the case, Mercier determined that he ought to establish such right for himself and he set about precipitating an adjudication of the issue. The entire scene as he relates it is both quite priceless and inimitable in a condensation like this, so once again I can only encourage the reader to obtain Mercier’s original, unabridged “letter” to get the full flavor.  Here it is piecemeal:

“…I once sent my Driver’s License and ‘Cancellation Notice’ back to the state department of motor vehicles, but the rescission was bureaucratically rebuffed with the explanation that no provision for the licensee’s cancellation existed in state statutes; I knew the rebuffment had some merit to it, since those statutes formed the body of my contract where I initially applied for the Driver’s License….

“…Patriot Clowns… exaggerated the legal significance of the existence and non-existence of the written Driver’s License document itself, telling me that the Driver’s License was Evidence of Consent, and that the absence of which precludes the rightful assertion of a contract regulatory jurisdiction over motorists.

“As I will explain later on, contracts never have had to be in writing to be judicially enforceable; the practice of stating the contract in writing is actually of recent historical development, since writing instruments and common literacy are quite relatively recent developments of technology.”

He determined that the best way to provoke an adjudication of the issue was to get his driver’s license revoked, acknowledging the “alluring element of risk and naked defiance” that such a proposition presented.

“I had done my homework: Several hundred motions and demands were on my computer, just waiting for a Case Number to throw at a judge and his Star Chamber Traffic Court. I picked up a speeding ticket and after questioning the Administrative Law Judge several times about the legal relationship in effect between the state and a person holding a revoked Driver’s License, I was convinced that this was the way to go, after all, my legal mentors (Highway Contract Protestors) had counseled in this direction—they insisted that where there was no Driver’s License, there was no contract; and so I told the Administrative Law Judge that I would never surrender a dime to him. Hearing that defiant line from me in public, the judge revoked my license on the spot.  I walked out of the Hearing Office, took the plates off my car and tossed them aside.

“Some months later, after leaving the office building where I had been at work for the day, I knew when getting into my car that the big scene was going to happen that night. I was on my way home from work that night when I was finally stopped and charged with several heinous misdemeanors (revoked license, failure to stop when ordered, and resisting arrest (which means demanding your rights), among others)….

“…While filling out that NCIC Data Sheet of theirs on me, the arresting officer asked me a very reasonable question: Gee, George, why were you driving on a revoked Driver’s License? My response was to throw a few interesting Supreme Court quotations at him, whereupon he called for reinforcements and then turned me over to his commanding lieutenant; his lieutenant in turn then blew his top when I refused to consent to have them search the trunk of my car.”

Try as they might, the police could not obtain Mercier’s consent to search his vehicle.

“The arrest operation had lasted across several hours; the Sheriff’s Department had called out nine patrol cars and had detoured traffic around the arrest scene (they just love to put on a big production, after all, this highway is their kingdom). They probably resented the sub silentio Statement I was making by wearing very expensive business clothes and carrying a large amount of cash on me, while stingily refusing to spend so much as $18 to register my car. But I had a hunch that they resented most of all my cackles and giggling, which I had a difficult time restraining—after all, this was a criminal arrest, this was heinous, I was supposed to ‘have done something wrong’, I was supposed to have been feeling guilty, I was supposed to have earned a spanking.

“I was in the patrol car facing West, so the large evening sun was setting over the roof of my car parked in front of us, and just like in some Hollywood cliché scenario, the Sheriff’s Deputies had a small army of scavenger like silhouettes working my car over, taking whatever they could find in it, tossing it out on the road, and uttering salty frustrations at their legal disability to search my trunk without my consent.

“After having decided that they were not going to find anything in the car to justify throwing another slice of lex at me, they had one last item of business to attend to—they wanted to make sure that I understood that this Government Highway was their kingdom, and so they were determined to wipe that sneaky grin off my face. So they decided to make their closing Statement for the evening by dragging me in front of a judge, and then throwing a Criminal Arraignment at me.”

Mercier reflects on the criminal proceedings that ensued, noting: “I was threatened with a 30-day commitment at the State Hospital for a Psychiatric Examination because I had continuously refused to hire a lawyer.” [This is a typical in terrorem tactic of the courts—which, as explained earlier, cannot properly convict someone without an attorney’s representation—so beware of the consequences whenever you decide to “represent yourself”.] At one point in the proceedings that followed, Mercier ended up alone with the judge in his law office: “…and so I had it out with the judge, right then and there”.

“…The meeting lasted for several hours, and the judge explained to me in a round about and vague way how I was wrong on the merits of the large volume of Tort Law arguments that I had thrown at him.  He talked to me evasively about the duties of Citizenship (which is a Contract Law relationship), and how Licenses revoked by the state are in a special status where Contract Law still applies, although he did not specifically explain to me just why this is so; which means that I asked the Administrative Law Judge the wrong questions.

“When I probed deeper to extract detailed information as to whether it was the revoked nature of the old Driver’s License that continued to attach a regulatory jurisdiction, he said loosely that my revoked License status was not relevant in holding me to those Motor Vehicle statutes, and that I could be held to those statutes even if I had never applied for a License.  And so, even though I knew that he was withholding from me some Law that I wanted to know, I quickly reasoned that I was wrong not just for one reason, but for several substantive reasons, so I capitulated immediately, and the judge offered to give me a qualified dismissal, his head hanging down looking at the floor, probably finding his protracted conversation with some occasional sharp technical exchanges on the Law, particularly in the Counsel area, to have been simply incredible. And the prosecution so ended, quickly and unexpectedly. Suddenly, my Right to Travel Case, that I thought I would be arguing on appeal, just fell apart and collapsed right in front of me; my Case that I had spent so long in preparation and in building up an air-tight defense line just vanished from underneath me; all of the incredible amount of time that I had spent researching and writing my large volume of justifying defense arguments, of digging out large volumes of Highway Cases from the 1800s, and all of my meticulous records preservation of an arrest scene factual setting where rights were demanded: All of that went out the window for a reason that I never originally contemplated, a reason that I never thought of, and a reason that I never even considered as probable as I was writing those copious Tort Law arguments: an invisible contract I had no knowledge of, that suddenly made an unexpected appearance.”

A little further along, Mercier explains that in fact, from a judicial perspective, “Multiple invisible contracts were in effect that I had no knowledge of… [W]hen I used that Government Highway, I had accepted a special benefit that the New York Prince had conditionally offered to me—offered with expectations of reciprocity being held by the benefit’s donor, and so now an invisible contract was actually in effect.”

In concluding what he has to say about his Right to Travel case, he writes: “Criminal prosecutions are adversary proceedings, and even if you are correct, your failure to explain why to the Court is necessarily fatal, when certain invisible juristic contracts the Judge has already taken in camera Judicial Notice of, are prima facie Evidence of your… liability.” But he never does explain exactly, at this point at least, what specific, invisible, juristic contracts had bound him to the King, which leaves us with a bit of mystery on this specific issue. He does write in a footnote to this “chapter”, however:

“Just because the King sees things this way does not mean the King is correct, and additionally does not mean that the King cannot be argued around. Any Judge who has had civil Law and Motion experience knows that actions where Government is a party are quite frequent, and that Government attorneys are very often off-point in their arguments, excessive in their demands, weak in their knowledge of law, and just as plain wrong as is any other party. I have heard this complaint replicated from state Judges from several jurisdictions in the United States.  Virtually all seasoned Judges appreciate the fact that being an attorney for the King or a Prince does not endow such an attorney with supernatural perfection proclivities.”

Income Tax Protests

After discussing Armen Condo’s unteachable state of mind, a condition which precludes understanding of the King’s position, Mercier expounds upon the “rightness” of the King’s position with regard to 1040 filings:

“It is very much highly moral and proper for the Judiciary of the United States to forcibly extract a 1040 out of Taxpayers: because the mandatory disclosure of information in a 1040 is identical to the disclosure of information that is routinely extracted out of adversaries in civil litigation (called ‘Discovery’); and in a King’s Commerce setting, where the Taxpayer experienced financial enrichment and Federal Benefits in the context of reciprocity being expected, the Taxpayer and the King are in a Contractual relationship where Tort Law Principles of fairness and privacy are not even relevant.

“One of the reasons why the circumstances surrounding the initial execution of a contract, the contract’s existential raison d’etre, of any contract in Commerce is important is because the judicial enforceability of the contract drops a notch or two into another Status altogether if the deficiency element of either party never having experienced any benefit from that contract surfaces during a grievance as an attack strategy. This requirement of experiencing a benefit is very important in American jurisprudence, and properly so, since it is immoral and unethical to hold a contract against a person he received no benefit or gain from. In this case of entering into bank account contracts, could someone please show me how any person could possibly have a checking account or a bank loan, or any type of credit or depository relationship with a bank, and not experience a hard tangible financial benefit? This places Judges in a difficult position in that if they simply toss aside and annul contracts because one of the parties involved doesn’t feel like honoring some uncomfortable terms the contract now calls for, but that same nonchalant party does not want to give up or return any of the financial benefits they experienced under the life of the contract, then by examining the prospective consequences of potential annulment, we find that the Judge is actually in a difficult moral position for not enforcing the contract: because the nonchalant party gets away with the illicit retention of hard financial gain they experienced through the operation of the contract—if that prosecution ever gets dismissed.

This is a contributing reason as to why Federal Magistrates come down so hard on, and so openly, brazenly, and freely snort at ‘Tax Protestors’, so called, (and with so little concern for their being reversed on appeal), who are dragged into their Court by the King’s Agents on an administrative contract enforcement action—Willful Failure to File:  Because a Commercial contract was in effect, the Judge knows that the Defendant has experienced financial gain from that contract, and that now letting the Defendant out of the contract is immoral.”

He goes on to denigrate arguments that the income tax is an excise tax, which properly should not be applied to individuals:

“…Even though the Income Tax is an Excise Tax, it is also a Franchise Tax and several other things.  This is why Federal Judges openly snort at folks making a defense to the Income Tax, so-called, or its administrative mandates in Title 26, based on deficiencies claimed from its Commercial Excise Tax application perspective.”

Such arguments “are only valid and legitimate, if and only if, [you have] …previously cut and terminated all other adhesive attachments of King’s Equity Jurisdiction, of which the Citizenship Contract is an important item, so that the only remaining disputed area of Equity Jurisdiction left over involves questions of voluntary entrance into Interstate Commerce, an area of Law very much appropriate for an Excise Tax. Then, and only then, do your arguments get addressed by Federal Magistrates. But such a pure and lily white person is extremely rare today, and such a pure and clean rescission out away from King’s Equity is a tactically difficult thing to do, even when you are planning it in advance and are trying to do it.”

Like a fly caught in the spider’s web, numerous points of contact with the web virtually preclude any possibility of escape—and escape can only occur when ALL points of adhesion are severed. Otherwise:

“The Income Tax is highly moral, ethical and correct at Law since mere contracts are being enforced, and it is your probing for technical outs, while retaining the benefits you experienced under the King’s benefits handout under the contract, that is immoral.”

Implicit Contracts

As we have seen and ought to know, contracts do not have to be in writing; a man’s word ought to be his bond.  In this section Mercier deals with unwritten, implicit contracts and shows that such contracts must exist in any situation where a benefit is offered and accepted: “…[W]hen an attachment of Equity Jurisdiction is present through the acceptance of federal benefits—this creates an invisible contract. The reason why the King has the right to summarily assess the amount due under unwritten contracts, when you and I might have to have a protracted Trial setting to settle disputed amounts of money, is because the King publishes the terms of his contracts out in the open in his statutes; so such a Public Notice nature of the King’s statutes is deemed by Judges to settle the question of the amount of money damages due. So the only question left to the IRS to address is simply whether or not you are a Taxpayer, and properly so. So by reverse reasoning, the only way out of the Income Tax, on grounds harmonious with Natural Law and the United States Supreme Court, is to so arrange your affairs as to preclude the attachment of liability to Title 26 altogether as a non-Taxpayer, not in Commerce, and not a recipient of Federal Benefits, and that is a difficult thing to do, generally speaking.”

Did anyone seize on the use of the phrase “Public Notice” in the preceding paragraph?  When something is put into a Public Notice it establishes a presumption.  In any controversy over the subject matter of a Public Notice referencing Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that presumption shifts to the adversarial party a responsibility to rebut the noticed facts.

In the case of statutes such presumptions appear to be quite binding—and they may well be, IF the law applies to the situation!

The Judge says, “It’s the LAW, Mister…” and our immediate tendency is to duck for cover. But what the judge may not be telling is that there might be exemptions to the law just cited, or that said law might not apply to the instant circumstances.  If you meekly ass-u-me that it does, then by presumption you are bound, rightly or wrongly.

For example, in a child custody case the Judge might state that it is the LAW that your child has to be immunized in order to go to school. Your lawyer sits silently, accepting the presumption.  Uh, OK? No, it is NOT OK—because the same law Title states that there is a specific exemption for “religious beliefs”, of which the Judge has chosen NOT to make you aware.  Moreover, if there is no contract of any kind between you and the King, perhaps the entire body of statutory law does not properly apply to YOU, specifically?

The King’s attorners are absolutely expert in creating binding contracts in exactly this way and unless you are alert to the games at hand, you can be bound so tightly and so quickly as to immediately know how that fly might feel caught in the web. One story goes that a judge asked a man who was challenging the court on the basis of jurisdiction to remove a toothpick from his mouth. When he did, he re-established the jurisdiction of the court—simply by complying with a request made of the “defendant”!

As Mercier concludes:

“So, do we really need a written contract on someone in order to bring them to their knees?  The answer is, no:  No written contract is required by any one in order to work someone else into an immoral position on… default… or some other technical contract requirement… No written statement of the contract is now necessary in the United States, or ever was necessary, going clear back in chronology to the Garden of Eden.

“However, in order to perfect judicial contract enforcement, it is required that you adduce evidence that a benefit was accepted by the other party against whom you are moving, and additionally, that the other party wanted to experience the benefit that you offered to them conditionally. This is a key Equity Jurisdiction Principle to understand in defining a relationship with your regional Prince; because the Prince does not need any individually negotiated, custom written contract from anyone in order to rightfully and properly extract money out of them in a civil extraction proceeding, or otherwise assert a Regulatory Jurisdiction against them… Like the Prince, the King also has his written prior notice and public notice statutes to point to, and so all the King now needs to do is to adduce some evidence that you experienced a benefit the King offered, and it then becomes unethical for the Federal Magistrate to work an immoral Tort on the King by restraining the unjust enrichment by the acceptance of the King’s benefits….

“…So, in Equity Relationships where contracts govern, no formal written contract is necessary to work someone else into an immoral position on their deficiency of quid pro quo reciprocity through the nonpayment of money to you. And when the King is a party to an unwritten and invisible contract, otherwise disputed factual setting arguments… are not applicable… due to the prior Public Notice effect of his statutes… If anyone ever tells you that our King is dim witted or dumb, get rid of such a person but quick.”

A footnote underscores the fact that our word is our bond, whether we realize it or not, by stating that we should:  “Always view contracts written on paper to represent a Statement of the Contract.”

In the next installment in this series, we will consider additional “points of attachment of King’s Equity Jurisdiction on us all.”